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the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")' and the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
("GATT")2- is the inclusion of intellectual property on the free
trade bandwagon. By definition, protecting intellectual property is
about restricting trade in certain goods. And the pharmaceutical
industry in the United States, the beneficiary of massive subsidies
and border protection against unwanted import competition, has
played a critical role in placing intellectual property protection on
the free trade agenda.
Yet, ironic or not, intellectual property protection has become a
central part of the free trade agenda, as well as the major global
trade agreements. This Article considers how this state of affairs
came about, and what it means for the Third World. Its crucial
concern is the range of pharmaceutical patent policy options that
remain open to Third World nations in the wake of the successful
conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the ensuing establishment
of the World Trade Organization ("WTO").
Section 2 provides some background on the range of possible
patent regimes. The goal of this section is to emphasize that there
is more than a single approach to patent policy. There are viable
alternatives to U.S.-style laws that current strict protectors of patents have historically used.
Section 3 recounts the U.S. pharmaceutical industry's political
offensive over the last fifteen years designed to force all nations to
adopt restrictive patent laws on the model of the United States.
Restrictive in this context means that they grant more rather than
less control to the patent holder. Restrictive patent rules are therefore the sort preferred by pharmaceutical patent holders. This section is itself divided into two parts. The first part describes the
maneuverings and power plays the pharmaceutical industry has
used with tremendous success to advance its global interests. The
second part focuses on the way the debate over global patent policy has been framed - the language, metaphors and, imagery characterizing the debate and how they have shaped conceptions about
1 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), reprinted in THE NAFTA (U.S. Gov't
Printing Office ed., 1993); see also North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (implementing necessary
changes in U.S. law to comply with NAFTA and reprinting the agreement).
2 See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter Final Act].
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property, particularly conceptions of moral right. This part further
shows how the pharmaceutical industry is attempting -on the political level, and in the way it frames its arguments -to suppress
alternatives to its preferred intellectual property regime. By elucidating this effort, this part attempts to reinforce the very point the
industry is trying to obscure: that there are alternatives.
Section 4 undertakes a close analysis of the GATT Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement ("TRIPS" or "the
Agreement"), 3 the basic thrust of which is to require all signatory
nations to adopt U.S.-style patent laws. This part argues that despite its highly restrictive appearance, the Agreement in fact leaves
a number of options open to Third World signatory nations. Under the Agreement, these countries must provide some patent protection, but it can differ in significant ways from the protections of
U.S. law.
Section 5 considers the costs and benefits of various patent policy alternatives. It focuses especially on compulsory licensing
schemes. The concluding part of this Article outlines a patent policy approach for Third World nations that conforms to the TRIPS
Agreement and would better serve their national interests than
strict U.S.-style laws.
2.

PATENT POLICY OPTIONS

2.1. Patent Policy Rationale
The logic underlying the creation of patents 4 is familiar: while
society wants knowledge in the public domain, inventors need
protection for their innovations in order to maintain an incentive
for creative inquiry. 5 The inventor could provide herself some protection by withholding information regarding the specifics of her
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,art. 66, para. 1, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994).

4 In the United States, for example, patents are awarded for new, useful, and
nonobvious products or processes, or new, useful and nonobvious improvements
to existing products or processes. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103(a) (1994).
5 See Gary Myers, The Restatement's Rejection of the MisappropriationTort: A
Victory for the Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. REV. 673, 685 (1996) (proclaiming the virtues of a system "which can provide protections sufficient to offer suitable incentives to create, while also limiting those rights in a manner that will permit broad
access to information").
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invention. However, this would keep the information out of the
public domain. The attraction of the patent, in addition to certain
enforcement and administrability benefits, is that the inventor immediately places her newly-created knowledge in the public domain. In exchange, she receives exclusive rights to use the pat6
ented knowledge for a limited period of time.
Justified even on its own terms, the patent is not an unmitigated good. Rather, it represents a compromise between competing
interests. 7 While the patent represents a positive good to the extent
that it provides desirable protection to inventors, it represents a
compromise from the perspective of public use.8 It does accomplish its stated goal of placing information regarding the newly invented item in the public domain, but it does so at the expense of
conditioning the right to use this information commercially on securing a license from the patent holder. A license can usually only
be acquired for a fee and, in the case of pharmaceuticals, is often
not available for any feasible price.
2.2. Specific Policy Options
As applied to pharmaceuticals, or any product, there is a wide
range of options in striking the balance between competing interests, some of which can be pursued in conjunction with others.
2.2.1.

U.S.-Style PatentProtections

At one end of the spectrum is the strict U.S. patent regime. 9
The U.S. system provides twenty years of patent protection for
both processes and products.10 There are no compulsory terms for
patent holders, who are free to license or not license their patent, to
use it or let it lie dormant for its entire life.'1
2.2.2.

No Patents

At the other end of the spectrum is a no-patent regime. Until
6 For example, in the United States, that period of time is 20 years. See 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
7 See Wendy J. Gordon, Comment, Assertive Modesty: An Economics of Intangibles, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2579, 2593 n.8 (1994) (explaining the policy balance involved).
8 See id.
9 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-203 (1994).
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
11 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-203 (1994).
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recently, Argentina and Brazil had no-patent systems for pharmaceuticals. 12 Companies were free to copy and sell pharmaceuticals
invented by other companies, even if patented in other countries,
without penalty.' 3 Unlike CD copying in China, which has been
the object of so much recent attention and fury, 14 pharmaceutical
companies in Argentina and Brazil engaged in copying were not
violating domestic law.
2.2.3.

Process Versus ProductPatents

One in-between position is to issue patents only on products
and not on processes, or only on processes and not on products. 15
Until recently, India's patent scheme was process-only for pharmaceuticals.' 6 A drug inventor could patent the process by which he
produced a pharmaceutical, but not the drug itself.' 7 Another producer was free to synthesize the same drug if she was able to develop another industrial process to do so. 18
2.2.4.

Different Length of Terms

The period of patent protection can be shortened or lengthened. Although the United States long held its seventeen year period inviolate, 19 there is no inherent reason why the protection
could not be afforded for only ten years-or thirty years, for that
matter.
See Bruce Rubenstein, Latin American Slow to Protect Patents Under Nafta,
v. 6, No. 52, Mar. 1996, at 17 (discussing Brazil's reluctance to
implement any patent scheme); Argentina: No Patents for Drugs Till 2005,
MARKETLETTER, Nov. 7, 1994, at 11 (stating that even if Argentina's Congress
passed the contemplated patent bill, pharmaceuticals would not enjoy patent protection until the year 2005).
13 See Rubenstein, supra note 12, at 17.
14 See Paul Blustein, U.S. Warns China to Step Up Efforts Against 'Piracy',
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1995, at B13.
15 For a summary of the arguments respecting process patents, see generally
Lara L. Douglass, Note, Medical Process Patents: Can We Live Without Them? Should
We?, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 161 (1995).
16 See Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Baldia, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J.TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 520
(1996).
17 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Need for Improved PatentProtection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 311 (1987).
18 See id.
19 Although the United State first afforded patent protection in 1793, the term
of patent protection was only 17 years until 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-465,
§ 532(a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4984 (1994) (amending 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988)).
12
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Compulsory Licensing

In a compulsory licensing scheme, U.S.-style patents are
granted, with one major caveat. During the patent's exclusive
term, patent holders are required to grant non-exclusive licenses to
competitors, or any entity that wants to use the patent, in exchange
for a reasonable licensing fee. 20 Until recently, Canada maintained
21
a compulsory licensing system for pharmaceuticals.
2.2.6.

Work-the-PatentRequirements

These requirements have at least two variants. In one, a patent
holder who does not "work the patent" -that is, bring it to the
market, either as its own good or as a component in another
good- within a certain time frame loses his patent rights. This policy addresses the concern that giant companies might file for and
control huge numbers of patents, thereby locking up domains of
knowledge, even though they do not put the patented knowledge
to use. This purely anti-competitive activity undermines the public
policy balancing embodied in the initial grant of a patent. This
type of work-the-patent requirement probably has little applicability to the pharmaceutical industry. In contrast, the second workthe-patent variant applies directly to the drug industry. It requires
a patent holder to literally "work the patent" in the country where
it holds the patent. For example, if Uruguay had such a requirement, and Johnson & Johnson took out a patent on a new drug, it
could not meet this requirement merely by selling the new drug in
Uruguay. It would have to produce the new drug in Uruguay or
lose patent protection there.
2.2.7.

Tax Schemes

Taxes can be levied on the sale of patented goods, with the proceeds allocated to purposes such as domestic research. This would
allow a country to reap the benefits of economic advantage from
the patents and re-invest those benefits in furthering scientific
knowledge.

20 For examples and an overview of compulsory licensing systems throughout the world, see Gianna Julian-Amold, International Compulsory Licensing: The
Rationalesand the Reality, 33 J.L. & TECH. 349 (1993).
21 See Janet Hamilton, Vhat's Going on in Intellectual Property Law?, 84 AM.
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 256, 258 (1990).
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Price Controls

2.2.8.

A nation can seek to limit drug prices by instituting a partial or
across-the-board system of price controls on pharmaceuticals.
Price controls on pharmaceuticals are common throughout the in22
dustrialized world.
2.3. Modern Patent Policies
Most industrialized countries now maintain strict patent regimes, but many of those nations only adopted strict patent laws in
23
recent years.
After World War II, many Third World nations began experimenting with the range of patent policy variations. 24 This experimentation became more purposeful in the 1960s and early 1970s,
when a call for a new international economic order arose from the
Third World. 25 Third World policy makers focused attention on
the issue of technology transfer. 26 No-patent regimes, compulsory
programs, and process patent systems all attracted the attention of
Third World governments and were used increasingly by these
27
countries.
3.

3.1.

THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY OFFENSIVE

PoliticalManeuvering

By the late 1970s, the momentum underlying the call for a new
international economic order had slowed significantly. With the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, the momentum shifted direction. By 1985, the pharmaceutical industry was on the offensive, in
an effort to force Third World countries to adopt U.S.-style patent

22 See, e.g., H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., tit I(f), § 1572 (1994) (containing
President Clinton's recent proposal for drug price controls).
23 See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
24 See GARY GEREFFI, THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND DEPENDENCY IN THE
THIRD WORLD 3 (1983) [hereinafter GEREFFI, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY] (stating
that "modernization theory arose after World War II").
25 See id. at 128-35 (citing the example of Mexico's "new major policy initiatives" in this time period).
26 See id. at 202-03 (citing India's attempts to transfer technology from transnational corporations to domestic industries through the use of various altered
policies).
27 See id.
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laws. 28 While the industry attempted to directly persuade Third
World policy makers of the merits of guaranteeing strict patent
protection, its main strategy was to persuade U.S. policy makers to
coerce Third World countries to adopt restrictive patent rules. 29
The U.S. pharmaceutical industry trade association-until recently known as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association
("PMA") and now called the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers Association ("PhRMA")30 -became one of the most aggressive and high profile trade groups in Washington. 31 The PMA
hired Gerald Mossinghoff, Assistant Commerce Secretary and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the Reagan administration from 1981 to 1985, as its president.32 Other prominent
government officials also spun through the revolving door between government and the pharmaceutical industry. For example,
PMA vice president Harvey E. Bale Jr. worked at the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative ("USTR") for twelve years, leaving in
1987. 33 David Bier, vice president for government affairs at Genentech Inc., a San Francisco-based biotechnology company, formerly
worked on trade and intellectual property matters for the House
Judiciary Committee. 34
Representatives of the PMA and individual pharmaceutical
companies acquired seats on important advisory boards that shape
government policy. Executives from Dow Chemical Co., Johnson
& Johnson, Merck, and other pharmaceutical firms became part of
a special presidential trade advisory group.35 Senior officials from
the PMA, Pfizer, and Immunon Technologies 36 joined a technical
advisory committee to the USTR on intellectual property rights. 37
Officials from DuPont, Monsanto and Procter & Gamble, each of
See Julie Kosterlitz, Rx: Higher Prices, NAT'L J.,
Feb. 13, 1993, at 76.
See id.
30 See Victor Ostrowidski, A New Look at the PMA: PharmaceuticalManufacturers Association Changes Name to PharmaceuticalResearch and Manufacturers Association, AM. DRUGGIST, June 1, 1994, at 11.
31 See Kosterlitz, supra note 28, at 77.
32 See id.
33 See id. ("Bale concedes that his connections are a plus for PMA. 'I hope so,'
he said. 'I don't hide it. In fact, I'm happy to help them out."').
34 See id.
35 See id.
36 Immunon Technologies is a Bedford Hills, New York, biotechnology firm.
See id.
37 See id.
28
29
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which has significant pharmaceutical interests, also served on the
advisory committee. 38 The industry also undertook aggressive
high-profile lobbying campaigns, testifying frequently before Congressional committees about the need to secure greater patent protection abroad. One significant element of the industry's political
campaign was the funding of academic studies proclaiming the
39
merits of strict patent protections.
Although the industry would come under attack domestically
in the 1980s and 1990s for maintaining inflated prices on domestic
sales, the campaign for the U.S. government to adopt the industry's
40
international goals as its own met with tremendous success.
Framing other nations' intellectual property regimes as a U.S. trade
issue, 41 the pharmaceutical industry succeeded in making strict international protection of intellectual property a central goal of U.S.
international economic policy.
The industry's success manifested itself in at least three ways.
First, the Office of the USTR exerted extraordinary pressure on in42
dividual Third World countries to adopt U.S.-style patent laws.
Second, intellectual property protection became a central component of NAFTA, and promises to be included in any additional regional free trade agreements involving the United States. 43 Third,
and most importantly, the United States insisted that intellectual
property protection be included in the Uruguay Round GATT neSee id.
See id.
40 U.S. Trade Representative Clayton K. Yeutter recalls that when he left government service at the end of the Ford administration, hardly anyone in
Washington had ever heard of the notion of intellectual property. He returned to government two years ago to find it one of the hottest buzzwords
in town. 'Intellectual property issues have become central to congressional
debate on trade policy,' says Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.).
John Burgess, Fighting Trespassing on "Intellectual Property": U.S. Tries to Prevent
Overseas Copying of Everything From Music to Microchips, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1987, at
H1.
41 The industry's success in framing its goal of securing strict patent protection in other countries was itself a victory. This is especially true in light of the
disparity between the industry's objectives and the traditional domain of international trade policy - which was primarily focused on tariff and related matters.
See Curtis Reitz, Enforcement of the GeneralAgreement on Tariffs and Trade, 17 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 555, 559-79 (1996) (discussing the history and legacy of the GATT
system prior to the Uruguay Round).
42 See Burgess, supra note 40, at H1, H4 (detailing the extensive pressure exerted by various U.S. government authorities, including the USTR).
43 See International Agreements: Intellectual Property Enforcement to Play Major
Role in NAFTA Talks, 8 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1553 (Oct. 23, 1991).
38
39
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gotiations, which began in 1986 and finally concluded in 1994.44
3.1.1.

Section 301

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the Office of the USTR, acting on
the authority conferred on it by Section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974, undertook an annual rite of placing countries which did not
provide adequate protection to U.S. intellectual property on
"watch lists" and "priority watch lists." 4 5 Those countries
placed
on watch lists were notified that the United States would impose
trade sanctions upon them (in the form of tariffs on their exports to
the United States) if they did not reform their patent laws. 46 The
process was intensified after 1988, when Congress enacted "Special
301" of the 1988 Trade Act, a provision which required the USTR to
impose sanctions on countries which did not revise their patent
laws.47

Although the USTR placed several dozen countries on watch
lists, the main targets of USTR sanction threats were large Third
World countries that had begun to develop domestic industries to
compete against U.S. pharmaceutical manufacturers in their domestic market: India, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, and Thailand. 48
Some observers speculated that the USTR focused particularly on
India and Brazil because of their leading role in advancing Third
World demands in GATT negotiations. 49
In October 1988, for the first time in the intellectual property
arena, the United States acted on its trade sanction threats.50 Acting in response to a petition filed by the PMA,51 and following
lengthy negotiations, the Reagan administration imposed 100% tariffs on thirty-nine million dollars worth of Brazilian imports.5 2 The
44 See Burgess, supra note 40, at H4.
45 See Hills Removes Taiwan, Korea, Saudia Arabiafrom Priority List, Five Countries Remain, 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1436 (Nov. 8, 1989).
46 See id.
47 See Kantor Singles Out Brazil, India, Thailand for Special 301 Designation, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 726 (May 5, 1993).
48 See id.
49 See Reagan, Charging Patent Piracy, Imposes Sanctions on $39 Million of Brazilian Goods, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1415 (Oct. 26, 1988) (reporting on
comments from foreign relations officials in Brazil).
50 See id.
51 In addition to requiring certain action by the USTR, Section 301 and Special
301 allow private parties to petition the Trade Representative to impose sanctions
against a country for discriminating against U.S. products. See id.
52 See id.
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government claimed that this amount was equivalent to the market
loss to U.S. pharmaceutical makers arising from Brazil's relative
lack of patent protections for pharmaceuticals.5 3 The Brazilian
government and media reacted with outrage. Reflecting popular
sentiment, Veja, a leading Brazilian weekly, headlined its story on
the sanctions as "The Empire Strikes Back." 54 The Brazilian government denounced the U.S. exercise in big power unilateralism as
illegal under GATT, claiming that the then-existing version of the
disputes
trade agreement required member countries to 5arbitrate
5
machinery.
through the GATT dispute settlement
The sanctions, and a change of government, succeeded in
changing Brazil's patent laws - though still not to U.S. satisfaction. In 1990, when the neo-liberal government of new President
Fernando Collor de Mello agreed to revise its patent law to provide
for strong patent protections, the United States lifted the sanctions.5 6 The 1990 agreement ameliorated the tension in the United
States-Brazil conflict, but it did not completely eliminate the friction. The USTR placed Brazil on its priority watch list in 1991 and
1992,57 and named Brazil one of the worst offenders of intellectual
property rights (a "priority foreign country") in 1993.58
53

See id. The Office of the USTR stated:

'The President declared his intention to take this action on July 22, 1988
at the conclusion of an unfair trade investigation under section 301 of our
trade laws, following over two years of unsatisfactory bilateral consultations,' [then-USTR] Clayton Yeutter said. 'Pharmaceutical and chemical
companies have little motivation to invest in the research and development of products important to mankind unless they are assured that the
right to market those products will be safeguarded by patent protection.
Patent piracy simply cannot go unchallenged.'
Press Release From the Office of the United States Trade Representative on President
Reagan's Decision to Impose Trade Sanctions Against Brazil,FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Oct.
20, 1988, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
54 See Julia Michaels, U.S. Sanctions Over Drug Patents Brings Sharp Words
From Brazil, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 25, 1988, at 1 (quoting the Veja article).
55 "Paulo Tarso Flecha de Lima, Brazilian foreign ministry's No. 2 official,
told a news conference that the sanctions are 'illegal, truculent, unjustified and do
not have the support of international law.'" William R. Long, Brazil Blasts U.S.Imposed Trade Sanctions as "Illegal" and "Unjustified", L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1988, at 2.
56 See Hills Lifts $40 Million in Sanctions After Brazil Pledges to Enact PatentLaw,
7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 996-97 (July 4, 1990).
57 See USTR Cites India, Taiwan, Thailand as Worst Intellectual Property Offenders, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 19, at 784-85 (May 6, 1992).
58 See Kantor Singles Out Brazil, India, Thailand for Special 301 Designation, 10
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 18, at 726 (May 5, 1993). The United States insisted
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With some variation, the USTR applied the same sort of persistent pressure to the other countries designated as primary infringers of U.S. companies' intellectual property. Thailand and Taiwan
both agreed to substantial changes in their patent laws, largely because of U.S. pressure. 59 India and Argentina essentially withstood
the direct pressure from the USTR.
3.1.2.

NAFTA

The inclusion of intellectual property protection in NAFTA required that both Mexico and Canada change their patent laws.
These changes were resisted most strongly in Canada, which had
long maintained a compulsory licensing scheme. 60
In 1987, Canada revised its Patent Act to provide patent protection for seven to ten years before triggering its compulsory licensing requirements. 61 Although welcomed by the Canadian and U.S.
pharmaceutical companies at the time, those changes left Canadian
law far short of U.S. standards. 62 NAFTA provided an opportunity
for the industry to address this shortfall. Indeed, on February 4,
1993, Canada enacted Bill C-91, replacing its compulsory system
with a U.S.-style regime. 63
But this change only came after a long and bitter fight. That
fight was predictable, given the prevailing analysis that "[there's
one point everyone agrees on: The federal government's new patent plan will raise drug prices." 64 Estimates of the cost to Canadian
consumers of passage of C-91 ranged as high as seven billion Canadian dollars over a twenty-year period. 65 In the face of these estimates of skyrocketing prices, the industry promised that, if the
bill were passed, it would invest an additional $530.6 million in research in Canada, raising its percentage of profits devoted to rethat Brazil's patent protections were too short, and complained about working requirements and compulsory licensing provisions. See id.
59 See Peter Ungphakorn, Thais Pass Bill After American Patent Demands, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 28, 1992, at 3; Taiwan Strengthens Patent Laws to Help GATT Entry,
Reuters, Dec. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
60 See Kosterlitz, supra note 28, at 76.
61 See Act of Nov. 19, 1987, ch. 41, 1987 S.C. 1171 (Can.).
62 See id.
63 See Patent Act Amendments Receive Royal Assent, Canada NewsWire, Feb. 4,
1993, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
64 Ian Austen, Side Effects Unknown: Estimates of Cost, Real Impact of New Law
Vary Wildly, OTrAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 6, 1992, at A7.
65 See id.
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search from eight to ten.66
Opponents of the patent law reform included the thenopposition Liberal Party, the Canadian generic drug industry, consumer advocates, health activists, and all of the country's provincial governments. 67 They harped on the expected cost of the
change. 68 Opponents also emphasized the consequences of Canada's previous stronger patent policy enacted in 1987: drug costs
had risen; only approximately 400 of the 3,000 new research jobs
promised by the industry had been created; little basic drug research took place in Canada; and Canada had gained little ability
to manufacture the active ingredients of drugs. 69 Opponents lobbied hard and undertook a substantial public education effort, but
their efforts fell for naught. 70 The Conservative Party then held an
absolute majority in Parliament, rendering the result of the fight
predetermined once the government committed itself to Bill C-91.71
The generic industry also unsuccessfully sought to prevent enactment of C-91 by legal action, claiming it violated the 1987 Patent
Act's provision precluding further revisions to the country's patent
72
law for a ten-year period.
All parties saw the passage of C-91 as a victory for the U.S.
pharmaceutical industry, and one orchestrated by the industry as
well. The Canadian industry is effectively a subset of the U.S. industry. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association ("PMA")
of Canada is a mere fief of the U.S. PMA. Among the "Canadian"
companies pledging to increase their Canadian research if C-91
passed were: Marion Merrell Dow, Merck Frosst Canada, Bristol3
Myers Squibb, Pfizer Canada, Eli Lilly Canada, and Upjohn.7 It
66 See CanadianC-91 Goes to the Senate, MARKETLETFER, Dec. 21, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
67 See Shawn McCarthy, Provinces Try Last-Ditch Plea to Halt Drug Bill,
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 18, 1992, at A10.In Canada's highly decentralized governing
system, the provinces are largely responsible for running the health care system,
and it is the provinces who will be forced, in significant part, to bear whatever increased costs attach to C-91. See id.
68 See id.
69 See Ian Austen, Few Benefits from 1987 Drug-Patent Changes: Study; Despite
Report, Ottawa Moves to Further Reduce Competition in Pharmaceutical Industry,
GAZETTE (Montreal), Sept. 17, 1992, at E3.
70 See Canada's Bill C-91 Almost There, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWs, Dec. 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
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seemed clear that the U.S. companies were able to advance their interests through their branch operations and subsidiaries in Canada.
These companies also lobbied from the U.S. side of the border.
One manifestation of the U.S. industry's influence appeared in a
letter to then-USTR Carla Hills from the Intellectual Property
Committee, a coalition of thirteen major U.S. companies including
DuPont, Merck, Pfizer, IBM, General Electric, and General Motors. 74 The letter included negotiating instructions and specific
demands for inclusions in NAFTA to satisfy industry. 75 The letter
was leaked in Canada, sparking outrage. 76 The success of the U.S.
industry in securing patent provisions in NAFTA was perhaps best
summarized by Edgar G. Davis, former vice president of Eli Lilly
and now professor at Harvard University's Kennedy School of
Government. 77 Davis boasts that putting the patent provisions in
NAFTA was "'a master stroke, [demonstrating] what an industry
that has its act together can accomplish."' 78
3.1.3.

The GATT Attack

The industry's success through 301 actions and NAFTA were
critically important. It was able to set an example by targeting the
most prominent opponents of alternative pharmaceutical patent
regimes. But the one-country-at-a-time approach also had significant drawbacks for the industry, the most obvious of which was
that it was inefficient. There are far too many countries with lucrative pharmaceutical markets to approach individually. If pharmaceutical companies' intellectual property was truly going to be protected on a global basis, some kind of comprehensive agreement
would be necessary.
GATT was not the most obvious place for fashioning such an
agreement. The existing international agreements on intellectual
property, the Paris Convention on patents 79 and the Berne Convention on copyrights, 0 are administered by the United Nations74 See Linda Diebel, How U.S. Drug Lobby Put New Patent Law Atop Canada's
Agenda, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 6, 1992, at Al.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Milt Freudenheirn, Canadians See Rise in Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
16, 1992, at Dl.
78 Id.
79 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14,
1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
80 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
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affiliated World Intellectual Property Organization ("WIPO").81
Third World countries strongly favored WIPO negotiations over
revision to international intellectual property obligations. 82 They
noted that the WIPO had traditionally handled such matters. 83
Furthermore, Third World countries felt that they would exercise
greater influence in WIPO negotiations than they would in
GATT.84 The United States insisted, however, that the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations include intellectual property.8 5 This
point continued to be disputed into the negotiations, with Chile asserting as late as 1990 that intellectual property standards are
themselves neutral and that all substantive proposals on intellectual property made in GATT should be forwarded to WIPO.86 Nonetheless, the U.S. insistence on confining the negotiations to GATT
prevailed, and the WIPO alternative faded as the Uruguay Round
negotiations continued into the 1990s. 87 The United States also rejected out of hand a Third World proposal to negotiate separate
agreements covering counterfeit goods and patents. 88
Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the United States maintained a firm stance; for an agreement to be reached, other countries would have to adjust to its position. 89 That position, essentially calling for the world to adopt U.S.-style patent law, was
developed largely by the pharmaceutical industry, according to the
industry itself. The Intellectual Property Committee ("IPC")
claimed to have "'played a key advisory role, at USTR's request, in
developing the official U.S. proposal on intellectual property that
July 1, 1967, 828 U.N.T.S. 22.
81 See id. art. 1 (referencing the WIPO).
82 See Craig Edgar, Note, Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof, 34
WASHBURN L. J.76, 98 n.54 (1994).
83

See id.

See Jean M. Dettmann, GATT: An Opportunity for an Intellectual Property
Rights Solution, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAWJ. 347, 356 (1991) (explaining that in WIPO, each
nation has a vote and Third World Countries outnumber developed countries,
whereas GATT relies on a "consensus" framework giving developed countries
more leverage).
85 See Robert Weissman, Patent Plunder: TRIPping the Third World, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, Nov. 1990, at 8.
84

86

87

See id. at 9.
See id.

88 See id.
89 See GATT: U.S. Proposal on Intellectual Property Is Presented to GATT, Gets
Mixed Reviews, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 680 (May 16, 1990) (detailing a
United States proposal encouraged by other industrialized countries and criticized by Third World countries).
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the U.S. government tabled before the GATT TRIPS working
groups in October 1987."'90 The Committee added in its promotional materials that its "'close relationship with USTR and Commerce has permitted the IPC to shape the U.S. proposals and negotiating positions during the course of the negotiations."' 91
The overwhelming success of the pharmaceutical industry's
GATT effort was highlighted in 1992. Ironically, this occurred
even as the industry was threatening to oppose the TRIPS Agreement. The source of the industry's frustration was the proposal for
a ten-year transition period for Third World nations to develop
full-fledged strict patent regimes. 92 The industry's vociferous opposition to a ten-year transition period 93 obscured how much it had
won. It had completely seized control of the terms of the debate.
The disputed issue was no longer whether the rest of the world
should or would adopt strict patent rules, but when it would.
Third World advocates of alternative patent policies had largely silenced their criticisms of the U.S. demands. Their silence reflected
domestic political changes; a decision to make sacrifices in the
TRIPS text in exchange for purported benefits elsewhere in GATT;
and, critically, the fact that the global intellectual and political climate had changed, making it much harder to argue for alternative
patent schemes than it had been ten years earlier.
90 Weissman, supra note 85, at 8.

Id.
See, e.g., Harvey E. Bale, Jr., New GATT Draft Text is a Potential Step Backward for Intellectual Property Rights, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Mar. 6, 1992, at 12,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (criticizing the lenient nature of the
transition rules).
This criticism of the TRIPS agreement often focuses on the various economic
and non-economic harms purportedly caused by the continuing opportunity for international piracy over the ten-year transition period:
91

92

The December 20 TRIPS text, while containing a number of both positive
and negative elements, is critically defective because it would: (1) allow
at least another decade of theft of U.S. pharmaceutical and other innovations; (2) give pharmaceutical pirates in Argentina, Brazil, Thailand,
Hungary, India, and other developing nations grounds for opposing
early reforms that would stop piracy and encourage investment and innovation in these countries; and, (3) continue to foster for a decade the
export from India, et al., of substandard and counterfeit medicines that
seriously harm consumers and the environment of the Third World - a
subject of growing attention by the World Health Organization
("WHO").
Id.

93 This provision was eventually included in the final TRIPS Agreement. See
infra note 155 and accompanying text.
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3.2. The Conceptual Offensive: Framingfor Victory
Relying on the studies it had funded over the years, the industry was able to gather an impressive set of data and arguments to
make two powerful claims about the importance of patent protection.94 First, it contended that inadequate international intellectual
property protection costs U.S. manufacturers billions of dollars in
sales annually.95 No one estimated the cost to the drug industry at
anywhere near those levels, but the figure was placed in the billions nonetheless. 96 The ITC study estimated the cost to ten drug
manufacturers to be almost two billion dollars in 1986, and pharmaceutical maker Merck estimated the cost to be six billion dollars
annually for the entire industry. 97 In an era of persistent and large
U.S. trade deficits, these were numbers large enough to make policy makers take notice.
Second, the industry made an impressive set of arguments
about the necessity of strong intellectual property protection in fostering economic development. 98 It argued that respecting patent
rights would actually benefit the Third World by encouraging foreign and domestic investment in research and by enabling high
technology companies to engage in technology transfer with Third
World nations. 99
But however convincing these arguments, it was not their merit
which made it so difficult to defend genuine alternative approaches to patent policy by the early 1990s. 100 Rather, that depended crucially on the ability of the pharmaceutical industry and
its allies in the U.S. government 01 to frame the debate on their
terms.
94 See
REP., Mar.

Al Wyss, Patent Protection Winning New Round, CHEMICAL MARKETING
19, 1990, at SR22 (citing many of the studies used by the industry).
95 A widely cited study (the "ITC study") by the International Trade Commission ("ITC") placed the cost between $43 billion and $61 billion for all intellectual property violations. This estimate included not only generic drugs, but copyright violations like software copying and trademark infringements such as Rolex
watch imitations. See id.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp & Richard P. Rozek, Benefits and Costs of Intellectual Property Protection in Developing Countries,J. OF WORLD TRADE, Oct. 1990, at 75,
77-81 (discussing a study funded by a grant from the PMA).
99 See id.
100 See infra Section 6 for a critique of the second set of arguments.
101 The period of time involved here is expansive enough to include officials
in the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations.
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Rights Talk

Characterizing patent protections as a kind of intellectual
property "right" was a first step in setting the terms of debate.
This characterization is of course not novel; patents, trademarks,
and copyrights have long been viewed as intellectual property
rights. 102 This is evidenced, in part, by the common reference to intellectual property rights by the acronym "IPR." 10 3 Nor is the characterization, from a legal standpoint, startling or at all surprising.
Lawyers commonly understand that the holders of governmentauthorized powers have "rights," without attaching any particular
moral force to the term.
In the debate over international patent policy, however, the use
of the term "right" exercised an important influence. As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that while "rights" may be
commonplace in legal discourse, the allocation or recognition of a
right may nonetheless privilege certain actions or relations. Characterizing something as a right tends to immunize it from challenge both in practice and in the realm of ideas. To transgress a
right is to "violate" it, to commit a wrong. To define something as
a right is to remove it, more or less, from political challenge. Even
if it is not considered a "natural" right; in moral terms, a right is
supposed to be somewhat inviolate.
While rights talk may have the general effect in legal discourse
of elevating the defined conduct or relationship above politics, that
effect was particularly strong in the case of patent policy. The vociferous insistence of industry and the U.S. government assumed a
moral character. 10 4 This was an especially notable accomplishment
in light of the intangible nature of intellectual property. Additionally, intellectual property is more obviously a creation of the state
than other sorts of property. Hence it intuitively enjoys less of a
moral right than other property claims. At the practical level, one
does not receive a patent until an invention is certified by the state
as new, useful, and nonobvious10 5 This makes it unusually clear
that the state could choose not to grant the right at all. At the con102 See Robert Fredrico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC.
237, 238 (1936) (consistently describing patents as a "right").
103 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Comment, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property,94 COLUM. L. REv. 2655, 2655 (1994) (referring consistently to "IPRs").
104

See infra Section 3.2.2.

105

See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101-103 (1994) (prescribing conditions for patentabil-
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ceptual level, patent rights evaporate after a set period. 06 Governments may grant patents for longer or shorter periods, on conditions, or not at all. The characterization of an inventor or producer's intellectual property interest as a "right" works to obscure
107
the contingent nature of the patent.
3.2.2.

Piracy

The dominant and most aggressive metaphor of the debate was
piracy. The pharmaceutical industry and the U.S. government labeled generic drug companies which copied pharmaceuticals patented in other countries "pirates."108 They denounced countries
that permitted drug copying as harboring pirates. 109
The pharmaceutical industry did not invent this metaphor,
which has been used for hundreds of years."1 0 But the pharmaceutical industry did use the metaphor more extensively, aggressively,
and successfully than any before. It became a term with emotional
content, rather than just descriptive purpose.
The piracy metaphor effectively changed a policy debate into
an absolutist moral drama. Theft is simply wrong, and theft by
violence is even worse. There is no room for a policy discussion
about the merits of piracy, nor any space for compromise in the direction of pirates. Consider the stridency of C.L. Clemente, the
vice president-general counsel of Pfizer:
Why is it that another government can base a policy of
106 In part, this reflects the policy balancing embedded in the decision to
grant patents at all. See supra note 7 and accompanying discussion.
107 Put another way, imagine the debate was not about intellectual property
rights, but about intellectual property grants (or licenses or privileges). That
would cast the discussion in an entirely different light. If the government is granting something, it seems logical to permit the government to attach conditions to it.
A grant is discretionary as well, suggesting the government has the power - and
is morally entitled - to refuse to make the grant altogether.
108 See C.L. Clemente, A PharmaceuticalIndustry Perspective, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 127, 132-33
(Charles E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1988).
109 See id. Some Third World development activists and their allies in industrialized countries reverse the metaphor by labeling pharmaceutical company attempts to patent genetic strains cultivated by Third World farmers and herbalists
as "biopiracy." See Hope Shand, Patenting the Planet, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR,
June 1994, at 9; see also infra Section 3.2.3. (discussing the author versus source distinction).
110 See, e.g., Evans v. Eaton 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 161, 163 (1822) (describing an
alleged use of the Hopperboy, a flour manufacturing machine, as "pirating").
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helping the consumers in their country to steal foreignowned technology?

If we went back to the days when countries engaged in piracy, wouldn't it have been ludicrous to say, 'Well, Brazil
owes the United States a great deal of money, so we cannot
stop their pirates from boarding our ships because, after all,
they obtain a great deal of revenue from this, and gold and
silver, et cetera.' Obviously, that's absurd. It's really not
too different when we're talking about intellectual property; that kind of stealing is just as bad."'
Similarly, when the PMA voiced its opposition to a ten-year phasein for the strict GATT patent requirements, association representatives decried the effort to provide a "long 'grace period' for pi12
racy."1
3.2.3.

Author Versus Source

Professor James Boyle suggests another metaphor underlying
the patent policy debate: the figure of the romantic author as inventor and creator, someone with a right to make a property claim
because of the original contribution she has made to general
knowledge. 113 The PMA has not claimed for itself authority conferred by Shakespeare, but it is highly cognizant of the principle
enunciated by Professor Boyle. In fact, in 1994, the PMA changed
its name to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America." 4 This critical move emphasizes the originality and
unique contribution of member companies' research. The emphasis on their research efforts - as opposed to the "imitative" or pirating techniques 115 of their generic competitors -is a moral claim, a
Clemente, supra note 108, at 132-33.
Bale, supra note 92, at 12.
113 See James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright, Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1510 (1992).
114 See supra note 30.
115 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J. OF L. & TECH. 307, 307 (1987)
("There are two kinds of pharmaceutical companies: research-based companies
and imitators that do not carry out substantial research on their own but profit
11

112
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means to defend high drug prices in the United States and to justify the demand that other nations adopt U.S.-style patent laws. 116
This distinction serves as the basis for the normative "author versus source" dichotomy that the PhMRA attempts to exploit.
Perhaps the most illuminating application of Professor Boyle's
author versus source distinction is in the context of Third World
biological resources patenting. Most of the world's biodiversity is
located in the Third World, particularly in tropical and semitropical regions." 7 Only a relatively small fraction of that biodiversity has been categorized and studied, and scientists are increasingly coming to believe that it may contain the ingredients for
a wide array of life-saving medicines.11 8 Accordingly, multinational pharmaceutical corporations are increasingly surveying
plant life in Third World regions to locate genes that can form the
basis for new drugs." 9 Although naturally occurring substances
are not patentable, the pharmaceutical companies are able to synthesize chemical substances with mild alterations and patent
20
them.
The image of the adventurous pharmaceutical company explorer-genetic prospector superficially suggested by the corporate
effort to survey Third World genetic resources is inaccurate. Company representatives do not wander into the rain forest jungle to
collect samples. Instead, corporate botanists and anthropologists
rely on Third World farmers and herbalists, especially from indigenous communities that make their home in or live off of the
rain forest, to direct them to plants that they use in local medicines. 121 Over centuries, these farmers and herbalists have identified, cultivated, bred, and protected the plant varieties. 122 These
informal innovations are not patentable, however, because they are
not "new." 123 More obviously, a Kayapo farmer in Brazil and a Safrom the fruits of the research of others.").
116 Whether the claim to originality is fully justified is addressed in the public
versus private discussion, see infra section 3.2.4.
117 See Shayana Kadidal, Note, Plants, Poverty, and PharmaceuticalPatents, 103
YALE L.J. 223, 224 n.8 (1993).
118 See id. at 223 n.3.
119 See Klaus Basselmann, Plants and Politics: The International Legal Regime
Concerning Biotechnology and Biodiversity, 7 COLO. J. INT'L ENvT. L. & POL'Y 111, 117
(1996).
120 See Kadidal, supra note 117, at 237-43.
121 See Shand, supra note 109, at 10-11.
122 See id.
123 See id.
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kai herbalist in Indonesia have no practical means to patent their
innovations.
Permitting drug companies to patent company contributions,
and the legal inability of the Third World innovators to patent their
contributions, Boyle suggests, illustrates the power of the romantic
author impulse in patent law.1 24
The chemical company's scientists fit the paradigm of authorship. The farmers are everything that authors should
not be: their contribution comes from a community rather
than an individual, tradition rather than an innovation,
evolution rather than transformation. Guess who gets the
intellectual property right?125
The Third World farmers and herbalists' contribution is thus denigrated. The author versus source metaphor condemns them as
merely an adjunct of the source, the indigenous plants. 26 It further
shapes a substantial portion of patent allocations for the industry. 1 2 7

Recognition of this reality undermines the pharmaceutical
companies' moral claim to strict patent rules in every country. Furthermore, calling attention to the Third World's unacknowledged
contribution to the development of pharmaceuticals also raises the
possibility of alternative approaches to patent policy.
3.2.4.

Public Versus Private

The public versus private distinction pervades patent law. 28
Inventions already in the public domain cannot be patented, because they fail the novelty test. 29 At the same time, one of the mo124 See Boyle, supra note 113, at 1529.
125

Id.

126 See Shand, supra note 109, at 11.
127 See id. at 11 ("An estimated three-quarters of all plant-derived prescription
drugs were discovered as a result of their prior use in indigenous medicine. The
annual world market value of these medicines is estimated at $43 billion .... ).
128 "[Elvery dispute about property rights in information resolves itself into a
dispute about whether the issue 'is' in the public or the private realm." Boyle, supra note 113, at 1435.
129 See, e.g., Kevin Rhodes, Comment, The Federal Circuit's Patent Nonobviousness Standards: Theoretical Perspectives on Recent Doctrinal Changes, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
1051, 1051 (1991) (citing provisions of U.S. patent law, including 35 U.S.C. § 102
(1988)).
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tivating rationales of the patent system is to bring knowledge from
the private domain into the public by offering protections to private creators. 130 Furthermore, one of the conceptual tensions in
patent law is reflected in the determination of whether patents
should be issued for inventions building on information already in
131
the public domain.
What is defined as public and what is defined as private is thus
an ultimate issue of patent law. It is in the pharmaceutical companies' interest to define the biological resources of the Third World
as "the common heritage of mankind."1 32 That makes the resources public, and thus unpatentable. If the biological resources
are not patentable, then Third World countries are basically unable
to capture any of the wealth-producing benefits of their industrial
133
development.
The pharmaceutical industry, however, is far less generous in
its understanding of the public domain with regard to industrialized countries. For example, the U.S. government spends billions
annually on biomedical research. 34 Thus, government-funded research often provides the platform for industry to conduct its own
research. Furthermore, government-funded research often leads to
the discovery of new drugs which are exclusively licensed to private companies, or sometimes slightly modified and patented. 135 A
130 See J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An Empirical Investigation,2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 210 (1987).
131 For example, under a "labor theory of property rights" there is a strong
incentive to accord patent protection to the development of a useful invention
from a publicly known but undeveloped source. See John R. Thomas, The Question
ConcerningPatentLaw and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L. J. 35, 78 (1995).
132 See id. at 228 n.35 (discussing the origins of this phrase).
133 See id. at 224 ("Little or none of [the profits] go to the countries where
these naturally occurring compounds were originally found."). Contrast this case
to other sorts of resources, such as oil, where geographic location determines
ownership.
134 The total federal allocation for research and development in fiscal year
1993 was $76 billion. See Chris Lewis, Public Assets, Private Profits: Federal R&D
and CorporateGraft, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, January/February 1993, at 8. That
amount represented 46% of the total national expenditure, public and private, on
research and development. See id.
135 See id. The quintessential example of this point is AZT, one of the few
drugs available to relieve conditions associated with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV") and resulting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
("AIDS"). AZT was developed in federal government laboratories. See id.
Burroughs Wellcome, the British company which eventually acquired exclusive
control over the drug, contributed little money to the drug's development. See id.
The company only became interested after the National Cancer Institute had identified AZT as an effective agent in curbing the advance of AIDS among HIV-
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generous conception of the "public" nature of drugs developed
with a large dose of government funding could undermine the
pharmaceutical companies' patent claims.
There is no escaping the private-public distinction in patent
and intellectual property law. Certainly the pharmaceutical industry understands, at least implicitly, how to manipulate the distinction to its advantage. Consciously focusing on how this distinction
plays a key role in the allocation of intellectual property "rights"
should highlight the alternatives available to policy makers in providing either more or fewer protections to different parties.
positive patients. See id.
Consider also the remarkable findings of the Washington, D.C.-based Taxpayer
Assets Project ("TAP"):
For example, in a study presented in February 1993, TAP examined the
federal government's role in the development of all FDA approved cancer [fighting] drugs that were discovered since 1955, and found that 34 of
the 37 cancer [fighting] drugs were developed with significant federal
support.
Earlier this year, TAP presented a study of all "priority" drugs approved by the FDA from 1987 to 1991. During this 5 year period the
FDA issued 2,270 drug approvals, but most were for generic drugs or
new combinations of existing compounds. Only 117 of the new drug approvals involved so called "New Molecular Entities" (NMEs) ... drugs
distinctly different in composition from drugs already on the market. Of
these 117 NMEs, only 30 were judged by the FDA to be drugs that were
used in the treatment of severe illnesses or to represent a substantial gain
in therapeutic value.
Of these 30 "important" new drugs approved by the FDA, 15 benefited
from significant funding by the U.S. government. When one considers
the country where the drug was discovered the government's role is
even more important. Seventeen of the "important" new drugs were
discovered in the U.S. Of these drugs, 12 were developed with significant government funding - that is, 71% were developed with significant
government funding.
The U.S. government spends an enormous amount of money on health
care research, and this investment has been very productive. On the basis of our research, we have concluded that while the private sector's
R&D investments are also large, they tend to be directed at the lower risk
ventures, and often are directed at the development of so called "me too"
drugs, which do not represent significant improvements in therapy, but
rather are marginally different methods of treating illnesses which represent large markets, measured by the companies in the number of dollars
they will receive from consumers.
James P. Love, Pharmaceutical Drug Pricing: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Government Affairs, FED. DOCuMENT CLEARING HoUSE, July 27, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (citations omitted).
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4. GATT AND THE TRIPS AGREEMENT

4.1.

The WATO and the Promise of Forceful GATT Enforcement

In April 1994, the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations concluded. 136 In December 1994, the U.S. Senate approved the new
GATT, paving the way for the agreement to take effect in 1995.137
The Uruguay Round creates a new World Trade Organization
to administer and enforce the GATT agreements. 38 Under the
WTO, GATT member countries will be severely constrained from
violating the terms of any of the Uruguay Round agreements, in139
cluding the TRIPS Agreement.
The WTO includes a powerful new dispute resolution machinery to resolve disputes between GATT members about a nation's
140
adherence to the terms of the Uruguay Round agreements.
Three-person dispute settlement panels, composed of trade experts' 4 ' who meet in secret, 42 issue decisions on whether a country's actions, laws, or regulations violate the terms of a Uruguay
Round agreement. 4 3 Decisions of the dispute settlement panels
44
can be appealed to a standing seven-member Appellate Body.
Dispute panel decisions, or Appellate Body decisions in the instance of an appealed case, are final unless every WTO Member
nation -including the complaining country-agrees to reject the
136 See generally JEFFREY J. SCHOTT & JOHANNA W. BURMAN,

THE URUGUAY

ROUND: AN ASSESSMENT (1994) (detailing the long and complex process of negotiations involved in the Uruguay Round).
137 See H.R. 5110, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted) (evidencing the final ratification of the Uruguay Round); see also Helene Cooper & John Harwood, Major Shifts
in Trade are Ensured as GA7T Wins Key Senate Vote, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1994, at A12
(reporting on the Senate's approval of GATT).
138 See Final Act para. 1.
139 See generally Reitz, supra note 41 (discussing the new enforcement procedures of the Uruguay Round); see also Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding], Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226, app. 1 (specifically listing the TRIPS agreement as a
"covered agreement" under the understanding).
140 See Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. I.
141 See id. art. 8, para. 1.
142 See id. art. 2.
143 See id. art. 3.
144 See id. art. 17 (referring to the Appellate Body); see also Reitz, supra note 41,
at 582-84 (discussing the significance of the Appellate Body). Although the Appellate Body consists of seven members, only three members actually hear any
given appeal. See Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 17.
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panel or Appellate Body's recommendation. 145 This "reverse consensus" requirement turns past GATT practice on its head by
eliminating the de facto veto which member nations maintained
under the old GATT dispute settlement process 146 and gives every
WTO signatory the unilateral power to force adoption of any panel
147
or Appellate Body decision.
If the losing party declines to revise its laws to make them consistent with the panel's interpretation of WTO rules, then it must
either agree to pay perpetual compensation negotiated with the
prevailing party or face trade sanctions imposed by the prevailing
party. 148 Trade sanctions are to be of an amount equivalent to the
value of market access lost by the prevailing party due to the practices found WTO-illegal, but may be levied against any industrial
sector. 149
This complicated dispute settlement mechanism is likely to apply severe pressure on countries to alter patent or other laws found
by a dispute settlement panel to be WTO-illegal. Potential sanctions are likely to be large, especially from the viewpoint of poor
Third World nations. The threat of "cross-sectoral retaliation" the imposition of sanctions against a different economic sector than
the one in which the WTO-illegal law exists 50 - will be particularly
coercive. It raises the possibility that domestic lobbies in unrelated
industries would emerge to oppose laws or regulations found
WTO-illegal.' 5 1 These lobbies would represent industries that
would feel the pain of WTO-authorized sanctions but not reap the
See id. art. 16, para. 4. This entire body is referred to as the Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB"). See id.
146 See G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and Participationby Nonstate Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.INT'L ECON. L. 359, 363-65
(1996) (discussing the "de facto" veto power that the losing party enjoyed under
the previous system).
147 See Reitz, supra note 41, at 585-86 (discussing this "ingenious" method of
international enforcement).
148 See Dispute Settlement Understanding art. 22, para. 2.
149 See id. art. 22, para 4.
150 Cross-sectoral retaliation is expressly permitted in the Dispute Settlement
Understanding. See id. art. 22, para. 3(c). For example, if the United States successfully challenges Thailand's patent law, and Thailand refuses to repeal the law,
the United States could levy sanctions not just on the Thai pharmaceutical industry, but on Thai textile imports. See id.
151 Some commentators have even speculated about the effects that private
lobbies could have on the WTO process itself. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, Participation of Nongovernmental Organizationsin the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 331 (1996).
145
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benefits of the laws giving rise to sanctions. 152 Finally, WTO decisions are likely to give countries the political legitimacy to impose
more trade sanctions. Under the prior regime, even the United
States, which in the last fifteen years has been rhetorically belligerent about imposing sanctions against violators of international
53
trade rules, has been significantly constrained from doing so.'
This is part of the reason why U.S. trade negotiators sought to
strengthen the GATT dispute settlement procedure and why they
pointed to the final dispute settlement agreement as a victory.54
The bottom line: it is going to be far more difficult for countries especially less powerful countries-to maintain domestic laws in
contravention of GATT rules than it has been previously.
4.2.

PatentPolicy Alternatives Under TRIPS

Backed by its strong enforcement mechanism, the new GATT
unquestionably limits the patent policy options of national gov1 55
ernments in the Third World and the industrialized world alike.
The final TRIPS Agreement ultimately did mandate adoption of
U.S.-style patent laws - or so it seems at first glance. 56 However,
there are a number of exceptions and loopholes which leave countries with substantial leeway, though not as much as they had before the TRIPS Agreement, to experiment with different patent
schemes.
Section 5 of the TRIPS Agreement covers patent rules in Section
5, the core of which is Article 27 and 28.157 Article 27 defines patentable subject matter. 5 8 It provides, "[p]atents shall be available
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
152 For example, assume a WTO panel determined that French subsidies to
grape growers were violations of GATT principles in a complaint brought by the
United States. The United States, consistent with new GATT principles, could
impose sanctions on cheese imports from France. Cheese exporters in France
would obviously lobby against the grape growing subsidies since they receive no
benefit but would be damaged by the sanctions.
153 See Overview of the Results of the Uruguay Round: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transp., 103d Cong. 9 (1995) (statement of Hon.
Michael Kantor, United States Trade Representative).
154 See id.
155 Article 66 of the TRIPS agreement provides for a 10-year transition period
for least developed countries. They will not have to comply with the terms of the
agreement until 2005. See TRIPS Agreement art. 66.
156 See id.
157 See id. arts. 27-28.
158 See id. art. 27.
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technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step
and are capable of industrial application." 159 Article 27 also requires that patent rights be conferred "without discrimination as to
place of invention, field of technology, or whether the products are
imported or locally produced." 160 Article 28, Paragraph 1, defines
the rights conferred by a patent:
A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights:
(a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to
prevent third parties not having his consent from the
acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product;
(b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to
prevent third parties not having his consent from the
act of using the process, and from the acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes
at least the product obtained directly by that process.1 61
On their face, Articles 27 and 28 appear to preclude most of the
alternatives to strict patent regimes implemented or considered by
Third World countries in the last several decades. The requirement
that signatories grant patents for "any inventions.., in all fields of
technology" that are new, useful and non-obvious clearly encompasses pharmaceuticals, making the strategy of excluding pharmaceuticals from patent protection altogether GATT-illegal. The
Agreement specifically requires coverage of both products and
processes, precluding countries from establishing regimes which
recognize only one or the other. Article 33 requires that patent protection be afforded for twenty years from the date of filing, preventing countries from tinkering with the length of patents in order to calibrate the longitudinal strength of the monopoly they
159 Id. art. 27, para. 1. A footnote to the article establishes that "the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Member
to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively." Id. n.5.
160

Id. art. 27.

Id. art. 28, para. 1 (citation omitted). Article 29 establishes the reciprocal
conditions on patent applicants: they must "disclose their invention in a manner
sufficiently clear and complete for the invention to be carried out by a person
skilled in the art .. " Id. art. 29, para. 1.
161
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confer.162 Article 28's strict limitations on third parties' use of patents in the absence of the patent holders' consent seems to eliminate the possibility of compulsory licensing schemes. 63 Article 27's
requirement that patent rights be enjoyable without regard to
whether products are imported or locally produced precludes
work-the-patent requirements. 6 4
A comprehensive reading reveals, however, that special tax
schemes- as long as they are nondiscriminatory between domestic
and foreign producers - and price controls - again, so long as they
are nondiscriminatory -are not precluded by the core elements of
65
the Agreement.
Despite apparent narrowing of the patent policy alternatives
open to Third World countries, the TRIPS Agreement also contains
a number of exceptions arguably reopening opportunities seemingly foreclosed by the provisions discussed above. There are
three relevant exceptions explicitly stated in the TRIPS Agreement, 166 and one implied by the structure of the Agreement, which
should serve to preserve pharmaceutical patent policy alternatives
available to Third World policy makers.
The first exception is contained in Article 27. It permits exclusion from patentability where necessary to protect public health
and the environment. 67 Article 30 provides the second exception,
permitting members to provide limited exceptions to patent exclusivity, contingent upon a showing that the interests of the patent
See id. art. 33.
163 See id. art. 28. Indeed the terms are so all-inclusive that some generic drug
makers have complained that it will prevent all development of production processes for pharmaceuticals going off patent until after the patent expires, effectively
adding years to the length of time over which the patent holder will maintain a
monopoly over the patented product. See Generic Drug Industry Under Pressure on
Several Fronts, PHARMACEUTICAL Bus. NEWS, June 26, 1992, at 4 (Article 28 "'will
add about five years of effective patent life' (two years of product development
and three years for regulatory approval)" according to Wayne Schnarr, research
director of the Canadian Drug Manufacturers Association).
164 See supra section 2.2.5. (discussing work-the-patent requirements). Obviously, a patent that is invalid unless developed or used in the domestic countries
does not fulfill this non-discriminatory requirement.
165 See generally TRIPS Agreement.
166 A fourth, very important exception is not relevant to the discussion here.
The TRIPS agreement also provides that "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical
methods for treatment of animals and humans," as well as "plants and animals
other than microorganisms" may be excluded from patentability. Id. art. 27, para.
3.
167 See id. art. 27, para. 2.
162
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owner are not unreasonably infringed upon. 168 Article 31 provides
the third exception; it explicitly permits compulsory licensing subject to a long list of restrictions. 169 A fourth exception, implicit in
the Agreement's allowance of price controls, 170 effectively allows a
government to impose price controls or nondiscriminatory taxes
and condition their waiver on a patent holder's willingness to license its product or process on a non-exclusive basis.
4.2.1.

The PublicHealth Protection Provision

As referenced above, the TRIPS agreement contains a public
health exception:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or
health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because
the exploitation is prohibited by domestic law.171
By its terms, the public health exception permits countries to
deny patents altogether where they have a legitimate health or environmental reason to prevent the commercial exploitation of an
invention. Assuming the reason is legitimate, the exception will
permit a country to deny a patent to a particular drug or to all
drugs.
However, the provision requires the denial of patentability to
be linked to a denial of commercial exploitation of the invention. 172
This requirement substantially limits the scope of the public health
provision. It does not allow for either a no-patent system where
private corporations are free to produce and sell generic drugs for
profit or for compulsory licensing schemes. Both of these systems
implicitly contemplate commercial exploitation. Nor would it allow for shorter patent terms, since although they are designed to
speed generic production of drugs and thus lower overall drug
168 See id. art. 30.
169 See id. art. 31.
170 See id. art. 40, para. 2.
171 Id. art. 27, para. 2.
172 See id.
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prices, they too are based on expectations of future commercial ex173
ploitation.
Moreover, the public health provision offers no support to
work-the-patent requirements, which are designed to encourage
foreign investment and technology transfer. They are not necessarfly directly targeted at public health goals.
Still, the public health provision does offer at least one important alternative to Third World countries. Capitalizing on the provision, they could deny patentability for one or all drugs and produce and distribute them non-commercially through a state-owned
marketing board, quasi-state entity, single non-profit manufacturer, or system of non-profit manufacturers. Especially for countries pursuing Essential Drugs programs, 7 4 this government/nonprofit option may be attractive. In order to adopt a policy of domestic, non-commercial exploitation, however, a GATT signatory
nation would have to overcome another hurdle: the requirement
that its actions be "necessary."
In recent years, GATT dispute settlement panels have created a
substantial jurisprudence interpreting GATT Article XX, which
provides for general exceptions to GATT rules. 175 In the WTO ad173 A further consideration questions whether compulsory licensing schemes
or shorter terms would qualify under the public health provision for yet another
reason -the provision speaks of excluding from patentability, not conditioning patentability. An interesting argument could be formulated that the exclusion of patentability necessarily permits the conditioning of patentability-a kind of hierarchy of powers argument. Such an argument would be irrelevant, however, in
view of the preclusions presented by principles set forth in the main text above.
174 Essential Drugs programs rely on a government registry of a core group of
essential drugs, which are made available in generic form at low prices. See, e.g.,
John E.S. Parker, Pharmaceuticalsand Third World Concerns: The Lall Report and the
Otago Study, in THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPLY OF MEDICINES: IMPLICATIONS OF U.S.
REGULATORY REFORM 135, 139 (Robert B. Helms ed., 1980) (giving an example of
the Indian essential drug policy). Mild Essential Drugs programs can co-exist
with for-profit sales of drugs. More aggressive versions may involve a ban altogether on sales of non-listed drugs. See DIANNA MELROSE, BITTER PILLS: MEDICINES
AND THE THIRD WORLD POOR 148 (1982). The listed drugs are often produced by
domestic generic makers, but could be produced by government or non-profit entities. See id. at 153.
175 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. XX(b) [hereinafter GATT]. The provision states:

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human, animal or
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judicatory system, there is no formal system of stare decisis, but
relevant precedent nonetheless exerts strong persuasive influence
on current decisions. 176 The interpretation of the TRIPS Article 27
is likely to be shaped in significant part by the doctrines developed
in prior GATT Article XX decisions, and analyzing the scope of the
TRIPS public health provision requires a review of those decisions.177
The first critical Article XX decision involved a European Economic Community challenge to Section 337 of the U.S. Trade Act of
1930.178 That act established an optional procedure for U.S. patent
holders to bring legal action against foreign persons or corporations allegedly exporting to the United States products which infringed their patents. 179 While a purely domestic dispute over patent infringement would be heard in a federal district court, the
optional special procedure concerning alleged foreign infringers
involved a quasi-judicial hearing before an administrative law
judge of the U.S. International Trade Commission. 8 0 This hearing
varied in a variety of ways from federal district court proceedings.1 81
The then-EEC attacked the procedures as a discriminatory violation of GATT Article 111,182 which requires equal national treatment of imported goods. 8 3 The United States defended the parallel ITC proceedings on several grounds. One of these was Article
XX(d), permitting exceptions to GATT rules where "necessary to
secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including ...the proplant life or health ....
Id.; see also Reitz, supra note 41, at 569 n.63 (discussing a case between the United
States and Canada concerning resolution of Article XX issues).
176 See Pierre Pescatore, Drafting and Analyzing Decisions on Dispute Settlement,
in 1 PIERRE PESCATORE, ET AL., HANDBOOK OF WTO/GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT pt.
2, at 6, 23 (6th ed. 1995) (discussing the proper role of stare decisis in past and future GATT decisions).
177

See id.

See Report of the Panel on United States: Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, Nov. 7, 1989, GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345-46 (1990) [hereinafter Section
337 Panel Report].
179 See id. at 350.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 351. Domestic patent holders alleging foreign infringement
maintained the option of filing their case in federal district court. See id.
182 See GATT Art. III.
183 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 178, at 354.
178
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tection of patents." 184 The United States argued that the parallel
enforcement procedure was necessary to provide quick resolution
and adequate sanctions against foreign infringers who could not be
satisfactorily targeted through traditional civil remedies 85 The
GATT dispute resolution panel rejected the U.S. argument with
logic that has framed subsequent Article XX cases. 8 6 First, the
panel concluded that Article XX provided exceptions to the general
GATT rules, and that panels should first analyze challenged practices for consistency with general GATT rules. 8 7 Article XX analysis should ensue after a determination that certain conduct was a
violation. 188 This conclusion establishes that "Article XX(d) thus
provides for a limited and conditional exception from obligations
under other provisions." 1 9 In other words, Article XX should be
treated as a disfavored provision, with a special burden placed on
countries invoking it as a defense.
Second, and building on the first point, the Panel placed great
weight on the term "necessary" in Article XX:
It was clear to the Panel that a contracting party cannot justify a measure inconsistent with another GATT provision as
'necessary' in terms of Article XX(d) if an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is
available to it. By the same token, in cases where a measure
consistent with other GAT[ provisions is not reasonably
available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the
least degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions.90

184 GAT7 art. XX.

185 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 178, at 375.
186 See id. at 395.
187 See id. at 345 ("The Panel noted that Article XX is entitled 'General Exceptions'....").
188 See id.
189 Id. at 385.
190 Id. at 392-93. The Panel sought to limit the sweep of its ruling by stating:
The Panel wished to make it clear that this [the imposition of the leasttrade-restrictive test] does not mean that a contracting party could be
asked to change its substantive law or its desired level of enforcement of
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Henceforth, the "least-trade-restrictive" alternative test has been
used. It is a very intrusive test in terms of impingement on national sovereignty, and one destined to become a major source of
contention in the U.S. debate over the Uruguay Round agreements. 191 It also seems clear that it is still part of GATT/WTO ju1 92
risprudence.
Third, and again reflecting its disfavor for Article XX based defenses, the Panel determined that it was not enough for a country
to justify its entire challenged scheme as necessary. 193 "In the view
of the Panel, what has to be justified as 'necessary' under Article
XX(d) is each of the inconsistencies with another GATT article
found to exist... "194
The Section 337 case was an Article XX(d) case, involving a
measure purportedly necessary to enforce domestic laws. The interpretive conclusions of the Section 337 Panel arguably did not
apply to Article XX(b) concerning the protection of human, animal
or plant life and health.
The possibility of applying distinct standards to Articles XX(d)
and XX(b) was rejected, however, in 1990, exactly one year after the
Section 337 case, in the Thai Tobacco case. 195 The United States
sought to challenge Thailand's de facto ban on the importation of
foreign tobacco. 196 Its tobacco excise system authorized higher
taxes on foreign-made cigarettes in the event they were imthat law, provided that such law and such level of enforcement are the
same for imported and domestically produced products.
Id. at 393. Thus the disputed principle in the Section 337 case was that of nondiscrimination, not the substance of U.S. patent law.
191 The debate concerning GATT's impacts on U.S. sovereignty was particularly potent when the U.S. Senate considered ratification of the Uruguay Round.
See Leonard Bierman, et al., The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: World Trade
from a Market Perspective, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 821, 825 (1996).
192 On January 17, 1996, the first panel decision rendered under the new WTO
machinery was produced. See Bhushan Bahree, 'VTO Panel Rules Against U.S. in
Dispute Over Gasoline Norms, WALL ST. J., Jan. 18, 1996, at All. This panel decision
also relied on the "least-trade-restrictive" standard. See Office of the United States
Trade Representative, Panel Decision: Venezuela, Brazil, United States on the Rule Issued by the Environmental ProtectionAgency on 15 December 1993, Jan. 17, 1996, available in WESTLAW, GATT Database.
193 See Section 337 Panel Report, supra note 178, at 393.
Id. at 393 (emphasis added).
See Report of the Panel on Thailand: Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 200 (1990)
[hereinafter Thailand Tobacco Panel Report].
194

195

196

See id. at 204.
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ported. 197 It also included various tobacco industry regulations, including a ban on tobacco advertising, that the United States alleged
to be discriminatory practices in violation of GATT's general prohibition on quantitative restrictions of imports as well as the
Agreement's requirement of national treatment.198 The Panel determined that the Thai practices did violate the referenced GATT provisions, and then considered whether the Thai practices could be
justified as public health measures under Article XX(b).199
Most important in terms of establishing persuasive precedent,
the Thai Tobacco Panel imported the Article XX(d) analysis from
the Section 337 case into Article XX(b) analysis. Citing and quoting
the Section 337 case, the panel concluded that it "could see no reason why under Article XX the meaning of the term 'necessary' under paragraph (d) should not be the same as in paragraph (b)." 200
The Panel proceeded to adopt the Section 337 least-traderestrictive-alternative test:
The Panel concluded from the above that the import restrictions imposed by Thailand could be considered to be 'necessary' in terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General Agreement, or
less inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably
be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objec20
tives. 1
The Panel rejected Thailand's argument that its restriction of foreign tobacco imports and its conferral of a tobacco marketing monopoly on a state company were "necessary" to control the domestic supply of the public health menace of tobacco and to prevent
the importation of foreign cigarettes which contained extra dangerous additives. 202 Education campaigns, bans on advertising and
labeling requirements could all serve those goals in a less restrictive manner, the Panel reasoned. 203 It accepted Thailand's claim
that a nondiscriminatory ban on advertising did not violate naSee id. at 203.
See id. at 211-12.
199See id. at 221-22.
200 Id. at 223.
201 Id.
197
198

202
203

See id. at 226.
See id. at 224.
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tional treatment requirements; and, the Panel concluded, even if it
accepted the U.S. argument that the maintenance of an advertising
ban in the immediate aftermath of a prior state monopoly on tobacco would discriminate against foreign producers whose brand
names were relatively unknown, such discriminatory effect would
be justified under Article XX(b).204
A subsequent panel again adopted a narrow reading of Article
XX(b) in a 1991 decision condemning U.S. restrictions on imports
of tuna not caught by dolphin-friendly methods. 2 5 The TunaDolphin panel reiterated that Article XX permitted measures inconsistent with GATT only "to pursue overriding public policy
206
goals to the extent that such inconsistencies were unavoidable."
The Panel reasoned that rather than imposing import restrictions,
the United States should have sought to negotiate international cooperative arrangements. 2 7 It also concluded that the nature of the
U.S. import restriction - which pegged the permissible dolphin
kill of foreign tuna exporters to the number actually killed by U.S.
tuna fishers (allowing the foreign fishers a kill rate 1.25 times that
of the U.S. fishers - was not consistent with an Article XX(b) effort
208
to protect animal health.
If the Article XX(b) decisions are to stand as precedent for Article 27, then a country seeking to invoke Article 27 would have to be
prepared to argue that there was no means less inconsistent with
the TRIPS Agreement available to achieve its public health goals of
providing affordable essential drugs to its population. There
should be little difficulty in demonstrating the public health importance of providing essential drugs at an affordable price. There is
ample research showing the importance of access to affordable
drugs, and the WHO is a strong endorser of Essential Drugs programs, a fact a WTO panel is likely to note and defer to.209 But a
government would also have to show that no less inconsistent
204

See id.

See Report of the Panel on United States: Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
Aug. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin
Panel Report]. Because of the political controversy generated by the Panel report
- a controversy which threatened support for the North American Free Trade
Agreement and the Uruguay Round - the GATT signatory parties did not adopt
the report. See id.
205

206
207

208

Id. at 199.
See id. at 199-200.
See id.

209 Cf. Thailand Tobacco Panel Report, supra note 195, at 216 (asking for and
relying on opinions of WHO on health-related matters).
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measure existing to accomplish this end. A challenging party may
argue that government subsidies of drugs would accomplish the
purpose, but given the potential cost of a subsidy program, such an
alternative would not be reasonably available. Additionally, WTO
panels cannot allow the subsidy argument to defeat public health
programs, because it would swallow the entire public health provision of the TRIPS and the GATT. For example, in the Thai tobacco
case, given the foreign company name recognition disadvantage, it
would have been less inconsistent with GATT principles for Thailand not to ban advertising but to pay foreign tobacco companies
not to advertise. No one could reasonably propose such a standard. A more effective challenge to the non-commercial exploitation of drugs would be a claim that price controls would be less re210
strictive.
Another viable approach is available for a country defending a
non-commercial exploitation policy from a least-trade-restrictive
challenge. Specifically, a country could argue that the Article XX
jurisprudence, despite the similarity in language and purpose,
does not apply to Article 27. The development of the least-traderestrictive test in the Article XX context was rooted in a conception
of the Article as providing exceptions which were limited and conditional. 211 In contrast, Article 27, paragraph 2, is not an exception; it
is included in one of the core provisions of section 5, and it is part
of the very definition of patentable subject matter. 212 Thus the term
"necessary" in Article 27 should not be given the intrusive interpretation it has been in Article XX GATT Panel decisions. A less
stringent reading of "necessary" -something closer to important,
and with little or no attention to available alternatives 213 - is more
appropriate in this context. 214 Under this more deferential stan210 Indeed, if a patent holder were to agree to provide the desired drug at
marginal cost or below, this option should satisfy the government - at least insofar as it is motivated by legitimate public health concerns. Even while pursuing a
non-commercial exploitation strategy, a government could hope to build up domestic technological know-how. But while this would be a worthy goal, it would
not be cognizable as a legitimate one for Article 27 purposes.
211 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
212 See TRIPS Agreement art. 27, para. 2.
213 Or perhaps alternatives should be considered, but so should the political,
institutional and fiscal impediments to adopting those alternatives - a set of factors GATT/WTO panels have heretofore refused to consider.
214 This word [necessary] must be considered in the connection in which
it is used, as it is a word susceptible of various meanings. It may import
absolute physical necessity or inevitability, or it may import that which is
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dard, the defending country would make the same arguments, and
they would be nearly sure-fire winners.
4.2.2.

Article 30: Exceptions to Rights Conferred

TRIPS Article 30 potentially provides for very broad exceptions
to the patent requirements of the Agreement:
Members may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions
do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of
the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legiti215
mate interests of third parties.
Unlike Article XX of the GATT or Article 27, paragraph 2, of the
TRIPS Agreement, Article 30 does not limit the purposes for which
a country may make exceptions to the Agreement.216 Both public
health purposes and a desire to promote local industry are legitimate Article 30 purposes. This would seem to authorize countries
to undertake any of the range of patent policy options.
However, although Article 30 does not condition exceptions on
national purpose, it does impose conditions on the right to make
exceptions to the overall Agreement. 217 These conditions are logical, because there is no evidence that Article 30 was intended as an
all-purpose opt-out from TRIPS patent rules. The Article specifies
three limitations. First, exceptions must be "limited." 218 Second,
the exceptions cannot "unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent." 21 9 Third, the exception must not "unreasona220
bly prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner."
Quite obviously, none of these limitations are self-defining.
only convenient, useful, appropriate, suitable, proper, or conducive to the
end sought. It is an adjective expressing degrees, and may express mere
convenience or that which is indispensable or an absolute physical necessity.

218

1029 (6th ed. 1990).
TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
See id.
See id.
See id.

219

Id.

220

Id.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
215

216
217
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Whether they allow or preclude various patent policy alternatives
will turn on WTO panel interpretations of their meaning. The argument here is that these limitations should reasonably be interpreted to preserve a broad range of exceptions under Article 30,
and hence a broad range of pharmaceutical patent policy alternatives for Third World nations.
The first limitation on the Article 30 mandates that any exceptions must be limited.2 21 A strong case can be made that the meaning of "limited" is defined within the Article, by the subsequent
"provided that such exceptions ... " language. 2 2 In other words,
the subsequent, more precise conditions describe what "limited"
means in this precise context. The counterinterpretation would
hold that such a reading makes "limited" superfluous, that it is intended to have independent force. In support of this counterinterpretation, a country challenging a Third World patent law could
argue that Article 30 explicitly provides for exceptions, and one of
the teachings of the Article XX GATT Panel jurisprudence is that
exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly so as to preserve the
broad integrity of the core Agreement. 223 This argument carries
some weight, but is not decisive, because Article 30 does provide a
potential internal definition of "limited," while Article XX contains
no such definition of "necessary." 224 The merits of these arguments
appear about even.
Assume that the challenging country wins on this point, and
"limited" should be interpreted to mean something more than the
subsequent conditions in Article 30. "Limited" is still a term that
restricts scope, but to an indeterminate degree. It is not at all apparent what sort of principled, substantive content can be given to
the term other than those of the subsequent conditions. If "limited" is to have independent meaning, it must be that the Article 30
exception is not meant to be used to defeat the TRIPS Agreement
on patents altogether. And at this level, every patent policy option
discussed in the paper survives, because they are "limited" to the
case of pharmaceuticals. They do not contemplate restrictions on
225
patents in other fields.
The second Article 30 limitation, that a patent exception not
221

See id.

222 Id.
223 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
224 Compare TRIPS Agreement art. 30, with GATT art. XX.
225 This is not to argue that such restrictions might not be appropriate.
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unreasonably conflict with the owner's normal exploitation of it,226
poses fewer problems for countries seeking alternative pharmaceutical patent policies. Only a policy prohibiting a patent holder
from exploiting its patent-such as the government/non-profit
non-commercial proposal discussed in the context of the public
health provision 227 - would potentially run afoul of this limitation.
Even that proposal arguably would not "unreasonably" conflict
with the patent owner's rights, but there is no need to make such a
case in view of the TRIPS-legality of such a policy under the public
health provision. All of the other options discussed in this paper
would allow the patent holder to exploit the patent to whatever extent desired.
A nation challenging a Third World country's patent policy
could argue that "exploiting" a patent includes the right not to use
it or license it at all. This argument, however, would run contrary
to the common use of "exploitation" which means to make use of,
or to work up. 228 This argument would require claiming that normal exploitation of a patent includes purposeful non-exploitation
of it. That interpretation is more than the language can bear, since
the drafters could have written "does not unreasonably conflict
with patent holder rights" in the place of the exploitation clause
had they intended to convey such a meaning. Moreover, the very
next clause speaks to the "legitimate interests of the patent
owner," 229 which would make the exploitation clause redundant
were it to have the broad meaning required to include both exploitation and nonexploitation.
The third limitation - to not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner 23 0 - is really the crux of the matter.
This is especially true from the viewpoint of elaborating TRIPSlegal pharmaceutical patent policy. Critically, this limitation is itself limited, by a requirement to take into account the legitimate interests of third parties.231 In other words, it calls for a balancing
process. A valid policy must balance the interests of patentholding pharmaceutical companies in industrialized countries with
the interests of Third World citizens and domestic pharmaceutical
226
227

See TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
See supra section 4.2.1.

228 BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 579
229 TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
230
231

(6th ed. 1990).

See supranote 221 and accompanying text.
See supranote 216 and accompanying text.
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companies.
There is a strong case to be made that, in view of the pervasive
government subsidies from which the industry benefits, the "legitimate interests" of the industrialized country pharmaceutical
companies should be construed much more narrowly than the industry asserts. 232 Third World countries seeking to invoke Article
30 do not need to rest their case on this argument alone. The equities of the balance lie heavily on the side of Third World consumers, who are overwhelmingly poor and unable to afford important
drugs. Furthermore, unsanitary conditions and various conditions
associated with poverty make Third World citizens more susceptible to illness than industrialized country consumers. 233 The balance is further tipped in favor of permitting the less restrictive patent policies by virtue of the fact that Article 30 arguably allows
"prejudice" to the interests of the patent owner, just not "unrea" 234
sonable prejudice.
Thus, Article 30 should permit some of the patent policy alternatives discussed in this paper, but it probably requires that they
be carefully calibrated so as not to unreasonably or excessively infringe patent holder rights. 235 In this regard, shortening the life of
the patent for pharmaceuticals -as a means to promote the more
rapid diffusion of lower-priced generics-seems to pass Article 30
muster, although exactly how much shorter patents could be made
is unclear. At some point, shortening would arguably cross the
threshold into "unreasonably prejudice" territory. Compulsory licensing would also be permissible under the balancing test -again
to promote the diffusion of more affordable drugs to a poor population- but may require a royalty system to limit the degree of infringement of patent owners' interests.
Work-the-patent requirements would be harder to justify under Article 30, since they do not directly advance the public health
interest in lower drug prices, but they too may be permissible. An
argument on behalf of work-the-patent requirements would rest on
two grounds. First, that promoting technology transfer is a legitiSee supra note 135 and accompanying text.
The interests of Third World domestic producers probably count for little
in the balance, since developing local industry is an only minimally "legitimate"
third party interest in Uruguay Round terms, if it is legitimate at all.
234 See Trips Agreement art. 30.
235 The adverb here is "unreasonably," not "unnecessarily," which suggests a
much less strict standard than the least-trade-restrictive interpretation of Article
XX.
232
233
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mate interest of a third party, namely the country beneficiary of the
transfer. Second, to the extent that work-the-patent requirements
succeed at technology transfer and building up the domestic scientific base, they bring countries closer to developing their own independent research capacity. These research capacities could be
directed to addressing local diseases for which the treatment, prevention, or cure does not hold out the prospect of sufficient profit
to draw the interest of industrialized country pharmaceutical companies. That is, the argument would be that there is an indirect
public health interest in work-the-patent requirements.
Article 30 would not permit a no-patent system. Even if such a
system could be justified under the "unreasonable prejudice"
clause, Article 30 only allows for exceptions "to the exclusive rights
conferred by a patent," 236 meaning the patent itself must initially be
237
granted.
4.2.3.

Article 31: Other Use Without Authorization of the Right
Holder (Compulsory Licensing)

Article 31 specifically authorizes countries to undertake compulsory licensing schemes, contingent upon meeting a series of
provisions. 238 These conditions include: 239 (a) authorization for
compulsory licensing must be considered on the individual merits;
(b) the licensee must have "made efforts to obtain authorization
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time;" (c) the scope and duration of the license
can only be for specifically authorized purposes; (d) "such use
shall be non-exclusive;" (e) the license must be non-assignable; (f)
the use of the license must be predominantly for the supply of the
TRIPS Agreement art. 30.
Note that this requirement does not affect the other alternatives discussed
here. Compulsory licensing is clearly a limitation on patent exclusivity. For Article 30 purposes, so are work-the-patent and shorter terms provisions; work-thepatent provides for an exception to patent exclusivity where a patent holder does
not use the patent as part of a manufacturing process in the granting country, and
"shorter patent terms" -at least if properly drafted -provide for an exception to
patent exclusivity at the end of a patent term.
238 See TRIPS Agreement art. 31. The existence of specific authorization for
compulsory licensing in Article 31 does not preclude a compulsory licensing program under Article 30. Article 31 explicitly does not displace Article 30, but creates alternatives to member countries in addition to those made available under
Article 30. See TRIPS Agreement art. 31, n.7.
239 The lettering here tracks the lettering in Article 31.
236
237
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domestic market; (g) the license must "be terminated if and when
the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely to
recur"; (h) "the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration
in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic
value of the authorization;" and (i) and (j) the compelling of the license and the amount of remuneration must be open to judicial review. 240
Most of these provisions pose little problem for the operation
of an efficient compulsory licensing scheme. Provision (a) would
require a government agency to oversee the compulsory licensing
scheme, even where it maintained a strong presumption that it
would require licensing for most drugs. This may add unnecessary
bureaucracy, but it would not essentially impede a compulsory licensing program. It would provide the benefits of individualized
review, enabling the government to permit exclusive production
by the patent holder for "orphan drugs" -those which treat illnesses that do not occur in significant enough numbers to merit
drug company involvement in the absence of a right to charge especially high prices.
Provision (b) should be cause only for minimal delay. The potential problem in provision (b) - determination of reasonable
commercial terms-will be a consequence of the background understanding of adequate remuneration under provision (h). It does
not by itself pose any additional difficulties for a compulsory licensing program. Provisions (c), (d), and (e) should pose no particular difficulties in the pharmaceutical context.
Similarly, provision (g) seems likely to have little restrictive effect on compulsory licensing schemes for pharmaceuticals. The
circumstances giving rise to the compulsory scheme-poverty,
high incidence of disease, etc. -are not likely to cease any time
soon. And the judicial review required by provisions (i) and (j)
should pose few problems, either.
Provision (f), however, while not fatal to a well-run compulsory licensing regime, creates substantial difficulties. Generic manufacturers can lower their marginal costs by expanding their demand pool, that is, by selling in other countries. And a rationally
configured compulsory licensing scheme in many regions of the
Third World might rely heavily on a common market approach, so
that the countries of, for instance, East Africa would develop an integrated compulsory licensing and generic drug manufacturing
240

See id.
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and marketing approach. Provision (f)'s requirement that use be
"predominantly" for domestic use seems to preclude the full
elaboration of such an approach.
The critical potential obstacle to adoption of a compulsory licensing program under Article 31 is provision (h), requiring adequate remuneration be paid to involuntary patent licensors. What
constitutes adequate remuneration? Provision (h) says only that
"the economic value of the authorization" must be taken into account. But there is no single economic value of an involuntary license. As a general matter, the license will be worth more to the
involuntary grantor-who is thereby forced to sacrifice monopoly
profits-than it is to the nonexclusive grantee-who will only be
able to earn competitive profits. The question then becomes: in
the absence of any independent means to establish a level of adequacy, whose version of the economic value of the authorization
should control the meaning of adequate remuneration? The TRIPS
text does not provide an answer, but logic suggests the answer
must be the value to the grantee. Where the value is set at the
grantor's valuation, the patent holder would willingly grant the license without compulsion, and there would be no need for Article
31. In other words, defining adequate remuneration at the level of
the involuntary grantor's valuation would swallow up Article 31
24
altogether. 1
4.2.4.

Price Controls and Compulsory Licensing

The TRIPS Agreement does not mention price controls, which
remain legal under the Uruguay Round agreements as long as they
are administered in a non-discriminatory manner. 242 In some
cases, a government may find that price controls work well. But in
many instances price controls are an unsatisfactory policy instrument, from the perspective of all players. Patent holders characterize price controls as severe and arbitrary, and sometimes more
costly than compulsory licensing schemes. 243 Furthermore, price
controls are difficult for governments to administer, since they of241 I do not here consider what the value of the license is to the grantee, but it
should be set at a level to allow the grantee reasonable profits. The royalty formula could be attached to the grantee's profit margin, or to gross sales.
242 Any discriminatory action is likely to be violative of general GATT principles of unequal treatment. See GATT art. XVII.
243 See, e.g., Robert T. Abbott, Written Testimony Before the House Committee on
Science, Space and Technology, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Arcnws File (using his company, Viagene, as an example).
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ten require extensive investigation and negotiation with patent
holders. Additionally, the inherent uncertainty of the enterprise is
exacerbated because industry-provided data are somewhat suspect. Depending on implementation, price controls may be less
beneficial to consumers, who, at least with some drugs, may find
themselves paying higher prices than they would under an alternative scheme such as compulsory licensing. Furthermore, price controls do not benefit local, generic producers, who do not gain any
enhanced right to or claim on multinational pharmaceutical company patents.
Given the industry-wide dislike of price controls, the system
could be combined with a compulsory scheme to provide an independent TRIPS-legal basis for compulsory licensing. Pharmaceutical patent holders could be given a choice: accept price controls on the patented product or process, or agree to provide nonexclusive licenses to all domestic takers. 244 In the context of an aggressively administered price control system, most companies
would probably opt for the licensing alternative. This proposal
would not have to meld itself to fit in the constraints of Article 31,
because it would not constitute an allowance of use of the patent
"without the authorization of the right holder."
Even within the framework of Article 31, the price-control-orlicensing option could address the most contestable issue in Article
31: determining the economic value of the authorization. In the
context of a price control scheme, the economic value of a patent
would be substantially lower than it would be were the patent
holder permitted to charge unregulated, monopoly-profitmaximizing prices. Indeed, with an aggressively administered
price control system, the economic value may be the same to both
the licensor and the licensee.
5.

A POTENTIAL ALTERNATIVE

The central purpose of this Article is to argue that pharmaceutical patent policy alternatives remain viable under the TRIPS
Agreement. The existence of these alternatives, however, is of little
importance if none of the alternatives are attractive. This section
first assesses the advantages of the alternatives for Third World
countries, considers and largely rejects the arguments against the
efficacy of the alternatives, and then proposes, in capsule form, an
244

See James Love, Patents Vs. People, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, June 1994, at
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alternative pharmaceutical patent policy approach for Third World
countries.
5.1.

The Benefits of Limiting the Patent Right

The benefits of limiting the patent right accrue primarily to two
Third World groups: pharmaceutical consumers and Third World
generic manufacturers.
The benefit to the consumer is lower prices, meaning more affordable health care. By whatever means generic production is
prompted - no patents or compulsory licensing,245 or shorter patent terms 246 - prices will fall. The evidence on this point is irrefutable.
Schut and Van Bergeijk found that drug prices vary substantially across borders, 247 and that direct price controls, bulk purchasing, promotion of the use of generics and abolishing patents all
work to lower pharmaceutical prices. 248 The important implication
of their finding that "drug prices vary arbitrarily, depending on the
existence and degree of success of a national drug policy," they
conclude, is that pharmaceutical companies will charge what the
"market will bear." 249 There is a lot of room for play in pharmaceutical prices, and sound and effective national drug policies can
provide Third World consumers with substantial savings.250
The empirical evidence in support of the price-reducing effects
of the introduction of generics is overwhelming. 251 Empirical studies reveal that, "[o]ver time patents are a major factor in sustaining
high drug prices; the appearance of generic competition results in
prices of these drugs being much closer to the marginal production
245 Obviously either option would bring generic competitors into the market
almost immediately.
246 In contrast, shorter patent terms would spark generic competition sooner
than longer terms would.
247 See Frederick T. Schut & Peter A.G. Van Bergeijk, International Price Discrimination: The PharmaceuticalIndustry, 14 WORLD DEV. 1141, 1147 (1986). Specifically, a 10% increase in per capita income corresponds to an 8% increase in average drug prices. See id. Importantly, however, they note, "Although drug prices
in developing countries are often lower than in developed countries, the real costs
of these products, relative to the purchasing power of the population, are considerably higher (the real costs of drugs in Malawi are 12 times higher than in the
United States .... )." Id.
248 See id.
249 See id.
250 See id. at 1148.

251 See id. (surveying the extent of the evidence).
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costs than those of brand name companies." 252 In the United
States, generic producers "enter the market quoting prices much
lower than those of their branded competitors, and these prices
also decline as the number of generic competitors increases, potentially falling to roughly seventeen percent of the branded producer's pre-entry price." 253 In Canada, in 1983, when the country
maintained a compulsory licensing system, "[t]he average price of
compulsorily-licensed drugs sold by both the patent-holding and
the compulsorily-licensed firms in Canada was approximately half
the prices prevailing in the United States for the same drugs;" noncompulsorily licensed drugs in Canada cost an average of eighty
percent of the U.S. price. 254 In India, the adoption of price controls
and a process-only patents transformed Indian drug prices from
among the highest in the world to among the lowest. 255 And a nopatent system has driven down drug prices in Argentina as well. 256
Indeed, industry representatives and consultants do not dispute
the fact that generic producers drive down prices. Instead, their
argument is that prices need to be maintained to enable drug
manufacturers to recoup their investments. 25 7
252 Id. (providing anecdotal evidence of generics selling at one-tenth the price
of their brand name counterparts in the United States).
253 Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry and Competition in the U.S.
Pharmaceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTvI1TY:
MICROECONOMICS 1, 44-45 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1991). The
authors further note that "[tihe effect of additional generic competitors is also noticeably stronger on generic prices than on branded ones." Id. at 45. Former patent holders are able to build on name recognition, consumer confidence and, importantly, relations with doctors to continue selling at a supracompetitive price to
a substantial segment of the market. See id. at 46.
For a detailed study of the issue of substitution of generics in the United States
for brand name drugs (by state-funded medical providers), the potential savings
from substitution, and the cultural and institutional barriers to substitution, see generally ALISON MASSON & ROBERT L. STEINER, FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N GENERIC

SUBSTITUTION AND PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG
PRODUCT SELECTION LAWS (1985) (publishing a report from the U.S. Bureau of Eco-

nomics of the Federal Trade Commission on the effectiveness of substitution law).
254 H.C. Eastman, The Protection of Intellectual Property: PharmaceuticalProducts
in Canada, in MULTINATIONALS, GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER 153, 164-65 (A.E. Safarian & Gilles Y. Bertin, eds., 1987).
255 See Weissman, supra note 85, at 10 (citing a report from B.K. Keayla, convener of the Indian National Working Group on Patent Laws).
256 See Love, supra note 244, at 22. In an advertising campaign in the United
States in 1990, the Argentinean pharmaceutical manufacturers trade group highlighted the example of an anti-arthritis drug which sold in the United States for
$169.84, but only $35.08 in Argentina. See Weissman, supra note 85, at 10.
257 See Clemente, supra note 108, at 128-29.
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Limiting patent rights drives down prices because it facilitates
entry of generic imitative products.258 Because the technological
demands of producing an already patented product are substantially less than those of undertaking the research to create the patented product, less technologically sophisticated enterprises are
able to produce generics. 259 This provides an opportunity for
fledgling companies in Third World nations with sufficiently large
domestic markets. For example, India, Argentina, and Turkey
have all developed flourishing domestic pharmaceutical industries
in the last three decades. These are arguably the result of policies
of granting no pharmaceutical patents (Argentina and Turkey) or
imposing significant limits on them (India).260 Indeed, it was
through imitation that virtually every industrialized country built
up its technological capacity. 261 Although industry-sponsored
scholars claim that all technologically advanced countries maintain
strong patent laws, virtually every industrialized country adopted
strong patent laws after developing their technological infrastructure,262 in significant part through copying strategies. 263 Many of
Some observers argue that competition takes place among substitutable patented drugs. See Rapp and Rozek, supra note 98, at 90-96 (arguing that high costs
associated with greater intellectual property protection for pharmaceuticals are
often overstated because of incentives to find new uses for patented drugs and
competition among these drugs); Parker, supra note 174, at 136 (suggesting that
the high sales concentration in the pharmaceutical industry may often be accompanied by economic rivalry). To whatever extent this sort of competition does
take place, however, it clearly does not have the pro-competitive effects of generics. If it did, patent holders would not care about generic competition, and prices
would not fall so sharply with the introduction of generics. Moreover, to the extent that competition does take place among substitutable patented drugs, it is not
entirely socially optimal. Much of the research money invested in substitute
drugs could have been more profitably invested-from a social rather than private corporate viewpoint- in treatments for other ailments.
258 See Clemente, supra note 108, at 129.
259 See id.
260 See GEREFFI, PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, supra note 24, at 220-23 (discussing policies in Argentina); Arman S. Kirim, Reconsidering Patents and Economic Development: A Case Study of the Turkish PharmaceuticalIndustry, 13 WORLD DEV. 219,
220 (1985) [hereinafter Kirim, Reconsidering Patents] (stating that in Turkey
"[a]bolition of patents ...was an important factor underlying the substantial
growth of the locally-owned drug firms"); P.L. Narayana, Indian Pharmaceutical
Industry: Problems & Prospects,MARGIN, Jan. 1984, at 39 (relating to India).
261 See Rapp & Rozek, supranote 98, at 79.
262 See id.
263 Furthermore, in the information age - when new innovations build on
the foundation of earlier inventions to an ever greater extent - there is reason to
believe that copying is more important than ever if less industrialized nations do
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the most industrialized countries have only permitted patents on
264
pharmaceuticals in the last couple of decades.
If promoting a domestic pharmaceutical industry is a goal of
Third World policy makers, then limitations on patent rights are
sensible. But those outside of Third World countries hoping to
promote the development of domestic pharmaceutical industries
should take a clear-eyed approach. Domestic industries are not a
panacea for Third World ills. Based on his study of Turkey, Kirim
concludes that domestic manufacturers engage in many of the
same undesirable practices as their multinational counterparts. 265
Most notably, Turkey experienced spurious product differentiation, as well as production and promotion of drugs irrelevant to
major causes of mortality in Turkey. 266 Nonetheless, domestic industries provide national benefits that multinationals do not. Domestic companies are more likely to adapt and modify technologies for local use than multinationals. 267 They promote the
development of the local technological infrastructure and favor generics. 268 Furthermore, profits accumulated by domestic companot want to consign themselves to permanent have-not status.
264 Germany and France first granted patents for pharmaceuticals in 1967, the
Nordic countries in 1968, Japan in 1976, Switzerland in 1978, and Italy in 1979. See
Laudeline Auriol & Francois Pham, What Pattern in Patents?, OECD OBSERVER,
Dec. 1992, at 15, availablein LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
265 See Arman S. Kirim, TransnationalCorporations and Local Capital: Comparative Conduct and Performancein the Turkish PharmaceuticalIndustry, 14 WORLD DEV.
503, 516-17 (1986) [hereinafter Kirim, TransnationalCorporations].
266 See id. at 516.
267 See Gary Gereffi, The Global PharmaceuticalIndustry and its Impact in Latin
America, in PROFITS, PROGRESS AND POVERTY: CASE STUDIES OF INTERNATIONAL
INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA 259, 277-78 (Richard S. Newfarmer ed., 1985) [here-

inafter Gereffi, Global].
268 As Gereffi observes:
[Miany domestic private drug firms in the Third World contribute more
to national goals of resource efficiency and equity than TNCs [transnational corporations] do. The motives underlying this socially desirable
behavior are not altruistic, however. It just so happens that the selfinterest of local firms and national development objectives often overlap.
The tendency of local companies to reduce their reliance on foreign
know-how because it compromises management control coincides with
the Third World country's interest in technological autonomy. And
whereas domestic enterprises favor bulk drug and generic product
manufacture because the absence of heavy promotion and established
brand names makes competition with TNCs easier, developing nations
also prefer this strategy because it leads to increased vertical integration
and lower drug prices, especially for essential items required by the
poor.
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nies stay within the country, rather than flowing out and contributing to current account deficit problems. 269 Finally, many Third
World countries may desire to undertake a drug development policy geared toward meeting local needs that do not offer sufficient
market incentives to attract the interest of multinationals. If a
Third World country is going to rely on the private sector - rather
than government entities - to market and perhaps do final stage
development of the drugs, then it is likely to need a built-up domestic industry with which it can enter into formal or informal
partnership. 270 Even in the late stages of product development,
multinationals are not likely to pursue what appears from their
perspective as only a niche market burdened by various govern271
ment controls.
5.2.

The Costs of Limiting the Patent Right

Proponents of strict patent regimes contend strict regimes will
benefit Third World nations. 272 They assert that non-restrictive
patent systems will inhibit foreign investment-and hence technology transfer -and dampen the development of an indigenous
273
research and development capacity.
As a preliminary matter, for some Third World countries, neither of these purported costs of limited patent rights may be a concern. 274 For countries whose dominant or sole policy concern is
with disseminating a core group of most important drugs at low
prices -the "costs" of limiting the patent rights are not as signifi-

Id. at 295.
269 See id. at 277-78.
270 See Kirim, Reconsidering Patents, supra note 260, at 220. The existence of a
domestic industry may be necessary but it is certainly not sufficient. Developing a
local industry will not by itself automatically spark innovative research and development. See id.
271 Cf.A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 83 DUKE LAW J.831, 834-44 (1987) (stating that foreign
corporations are the most prevalent beneficiaries of patents in developing countries as "very few inventions are made by nationals").
272 See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 87-88 (noting that U.S. research and
development expenditure abroad is predominately focused in Western Europe
where intellectual property laws are adequate while falling in Latin American
where the industry claims it is inadequate); see generally Mossinghoff, supra note
115 (describing the effect of the patent laws of foreign countries on American
pharmaceutical research and development commitments).
273 See Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 87-88.
274 See Parker, supra note 174, at 139.
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cant. 275

But even those countries which are concerned with attracting
foreign investment and promoting local research and development
should not be deterred from limiting patent rights. The claim that
stronger patent protections fosters foreign investment is analytically suspect. In the context of pharmaceuticals, choosing the site
for investments is based on factors wholly distinct from the patent
protections afforded at the site. If Merck decides to set up research
facilities in Switzerland, Switzerland's patent rules are probably irrelevant. It plans to recoup its investment in the international and
primarily the U.S. market. The empirical evidence does not support the claim that limiting patent protections will result in decreased foreign investment. 276 In Turkey, "abolishing patents ...
has not adversely influenced the flow of direct foreign investment
and the transfer of technology into the country." 277 In Brazil,
which eliminated patent protection for pharmaceuticals in 1969 in
an effort to break the grip of multinationals over the local industry,
foreign investment in the industry rose nearly six times in the
1970s.

278

The more important claim by proponents of strict patent laws
is that inadequate patent protection will impede local research and
development, or multinational research and development designed to solve local problems. 279 There is at least a grain of truth
in this argument. It does seem likely that the promise of patent
monopolies might induce some research which would not otherwise take place. 280 However, this static analysis of the technological development process ignores the fact that Third World countries may not have the domestic capability to undertake that sort of
research. That capability may depend in part on building up a
domestic industry through pursuit of a nonrestrictive patent policy. Moreover, to the extent that strict patent protection is neces275

See id.

276

See Schut & Van Bergijk, supra note 247, at 1142.
Kirim, Reconsidering Patents, supra note 260, at 220.
See Gereffi, Global, supra note 267, at 289.

277
278

279 The literature supporting this contention is extensive. See, e.g., Parker, supra note 174, at 139; Rapp & Rozek, supra note 98, at 79.
280 Note that this assumes the Third World companies are domestically oriented, and primarily not looking to export to industrialized countries with strict
patent protections. If this assumption is incorrect, then local companies should
receive sufficient inducement from patent protections in the industrialized countries.
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sary to induce research, that protection still must come at the expense of the consumer and national interest in lower drug prices.
There is no reason to believe that the twenty year exclusive terms
mandated by the TRIPS Agreement 281 strikes the proper balance.
To the extent there is a need for a balance, it calls for careful calibration by policy makers administering price controls, or setting
the royalties in a compulsory licensing system, or determining the
length of domestic patent protection. "Ideally," concludes F.M.
Scherer, perhaps the leading scholar of compulsory licensing, "we
would like a flexible policy-one that can be 'fine-tuned' to individual circumstances. Despite this caveat, I am persuaded that
technical progress would not grind to a halt if a uniform policy of
compulsory licensing at 'reasonable royalties' ... were implemented." 282
Historical and recent empirical experience suggests Scherer's
claim is correct. It seems that proponents of strict patent policies
have vastly exaggerated whatever merit their argument may have.
After all, many industrialized countries developed pharmaceutical
industries in the absence of patent protection. Moreover, those
Third World countries not adopting strict patent policies have
proven more innovative than those who have. 28 3 J. Davidson
Frame, after conducting a global survey and regression analysis,
finds that countries with a low commitment to supporting intellectual property laws ("LOWCOMM countries") have, on average,
notably larger scientific and technological capacities than other
Third World countries. 28 4 He also finds that LOWCOMM countries
patent more heavily in the United States than do other Third
World countries. 285 Frame concludes that "it becomes increasingly
difficult to accept arguments by LOWCOMM countries that they
are weak, helpless actors in the international system who need special protection" 286 and that the LOWCOMM countries maintain a
"double standard." 287 But he strangely misses the more notable
281

See TRIPS Agreement art. 33.

282

F.M. SCHERER, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING 85

(Edwin J.Elton & Martin J.Gruber eds., 1977).
283 See J. Davidson Frame, National Commitment to Intellectual Property Protection: An EmpiricalInvestigation, 2 J.L. & TECH. 209, 215 (1987).
284 See id.
285 See id. at 216.
286 Id. at 215.
287 See id. at 216-17 ("These countries have been identified by various sources
as having the most flagrant disregard for intellectual property among the coun-
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implication of his findings: those countries with less restrictive
patent protections have developed stronger domestic research capacities while at the same time becoming more innovative.
There are unquestionably legitimate concerns about the degree
of innovation in Third World countries. But the claim that low levels of research and development are caused by inadequate patent
protection is dubious. What is missing to a greater or lesser degree
in most Third World countries is a science and technology infrastructure- a national system of advanced education and research.
A patent system simply cannot provide those things.
6.

CONCLUSION: FORMULATING AN ALTERNATIVE

The primary concerns of a rational drug policy for Third World
nations should be disseminating useful drugs as widely and
cheaply as possible, and encouraging research and development of
products to address local illnesses. 288 These will often include
tropical diseases that do not draw the attention of corporations
289
from industrialized countries.
As I have alluded earlier, I believe a critically important approach to the first of those goals is the adoption and implementation of an Essential Drugs program. 290 But Essential Drugs programs relate only tangentially to patent policy, and are outside of
the scope of this paper.
Within the realm of patent policy, the best means to achieve the
first goal - of providing drugs widely and cheaply

-

is to promote

generic production. I believe compulsory licensing-in conjunction with price controls if necessary to pass TRIPS muster-is the
most feasible means to promote generics. Compulsory licensing is
a decentralized, anti-bureaucratic means to ensure the rapid development of generics once the system is legislated into place or otherwise adopted. It is structurally pro-competitive, and hence not
easily susceptible to corruption, incompetence, or lack of resources.
The development of the domestic industry as an outgrowth of a
tries of the world, yet they are first among Third World countries to take advantage of intellectual property protection offered in the world's largest market.").
288 See Gereffi, supra note 267, at 276-77 (exploring the often inappropriate
mix of pharmaceuticals offered in Third World nations).
289 See, e.g., id. at 276 (pointing to India where the most prevalent diseases include malaria, dysentery, and filariasis, but pharmaceutical sales focus on vitamins, cold medicines, and "health restorers").
290 On the case for essential drugs programs, see generally MELROSE, supra
note 174.
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compulsory licensing system may aid in the creation of an indigenous research capacity and in promoting research on local illnesses. Historical experience shows, however, that developing a
domestic industry will not accomplish these goals by itself. To
achieve these ends, Third World nations should look to the example of the United States- not for its patent law, but for its biomedical infrastructure, which is crucially dependent on government
funding. 291 Collective action problems and other factors affecting
corporate incentive, structure, and organization preclude private
industry by itself from accomplishing what government funding
can: development of an indigenous capacity in basic and earlyphase applied research which creates breakthrough advances and
spins off into commercial applications. With very few exceptions,
however, Third World nations do not have available funds easily
diverted into biomedical research programs in national universities
or laboratories. There are, however, at least two attractive options
to generate these monies. First, a percentage of royalty payments
to patent licensors could go to a national biomedical fund.292 Second, a national tax could be placed on all drug sales, or, preferably,
on all non-essential drug sales, with the resulting revenue also directed to the national biomedical fund.
This collection of proposals would be: non-discriminatory in
GATT terms; compatible with the TRIPS Agreement; an effective
method of attending to the pharmaceutical-related public health
needs of the poor segments of the population; and an effective
means to overcome the spurious tradeoff between fair prices and
research posited by proponents of strict patent policies.
The key to implementing reforms of this sort is conceptualizing
and promoting them as legitimate and valid policy choices. Once
they have crossed the threshold of legitimacy in practical, political,
economic, legal, and metaphoric terms, they can be considered on
their merits. This will provide the best ultimate chance of popular
acceptance and approval, and, ultimately, implementation.

291 This portion of this Article's proposal elaborates on suggestions made by
James Love. See Love, supra note 244, at 24.
292 This can be conceived of as an amount separate from the royalty, a tax on
the royalty or a portion of the royalty - all three are essentially the same.
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